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THE HUMAN RIGHTS JUSTIFICATION FOR CONSENT
VIJAY M. PADMANABHAN*
ABSTRACT
Human rights actors have advocated and implemented
changes in how international human rights law is made and
interpreted to reduce a State’s control over the content of its human
rights obligations. Such efforts are premised on the view that State
consent is an impediment to development of human rights. This
article argues, however, that State consent is essential to the
protection of the human right of self-determination, a right which
guarantees people collective control over their political, economic,
social, and cultural development.
Thus, efforts to expand
international human rights without State consent are in tension
with human rights.
Because consent is essential to protecting the right to selfdetermination, efforts to limit State consent must be undertaken
consistently with the traditional methodology for adjudicating
rights competitions: proportionality analysis. Proportionality
requires that limitations upon self-determination be based upon a
human rights rationale that is proportionate to the restriction in
question. Advocates for diminishing the role of State consent in
human rights lawmaking have not conducted this analysis.
Proportionality analysis reveals the need to develop additional
human rights rationales to support restrictions on selfdetermination. It also reveals the need to modulate restrictions on
self-determination to better match the rationales proffered.
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INTRODUCTION

“The international human rights program is more than a
piecemeal addition to the traditional corpus of international law
. . . . By shifting the fulcrum of the system from the protection of
sovereigns to the protection of people, it works qualitative changes
in virtually every component.”1 Michael Reisman’s prophetic
words from 1990 foreshadowed a continuing struggle within
international law generally, and human rights law specifically, to
adapt international law developed during an age of States’ rights
to a system ever-more organized around the protection of human
rights.
One area where this struggle has been ongoing has been with
respect to the mechanisms by which international human rights
obligations are created. It is axiomatic to describe the international
legal system as voluntary: a State is bound only by those
international legal obligations to which it consents.2 This statement
is an oversimplification of even traditional doctrine, which has
recognized that customary norms bind unaware or objecting
States.3 But State consent is the primary grounds for international
legal obligation.
A primarily voluntary legal system has traditionally been
justified as an attribute of State sovereignty; consent ensures that
State autonomy is limited only if the State agrees.4 But a voluntary
legal system has drawbacks if the goal is protection of human
rights as opposed to States’ rights. An international human rights
regulatory system developed through consent is riddled with
geographic gaps, is normatively thin, and evolves slowly given the
encumbrances of consent-based lawmaking.5 It also gives States
1 W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 872 (1990).
2 See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) (“The
rules of law binding upon States . . . emanate from their own free will . . . .
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.”).
3 See infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (describing difficulty in
reconciling peremptory norms and the obligations of newly created States with
the consent principle).
4 See John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated
Concept, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 782 (2003) (linking sovereignty to consent as the
foundation of international law).
5 See infra Section 2.1 (providing human rights criticisms of the consent
principle).
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complete control over the development of human rights
obligations, which is in tension with the reality that States are the
primary violators of human rights and undermines the global
cosmopolitan ethos.6 Scholars, international institutions, and
human rights activists have been consequently critical of the
voluntary international legal system.7
To ameliorate these concerns, many international legal actors
have advocated for the diminishment of the consent principle. The
International Court of Justice has promulgated a rule easing the
formation of custom in the face of contrary practice.8 Scholars and
activists have advocated for an ever-growing list of jus cogens
norms from which persistent objection is not permitted.9
In treaty law, institutions involved in interpreting human
rights treaties employ a teleological approach to interpretation that
can result in locating obligations not agreed to by the parties.10 The
Human Rights Committee (HRC), a treaty monitoring body (TMB)
created by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), has claimed the right to sever invalid reservations and
hold States responsible for the original treaty provision, without
subsequent opportunity for the State to exit the treaty.11
All of these efforts are premised on the belief that reducing the
domain for State consent is a normative positive for a system
oriented around protection of human rights. But this analysis
suffers from an important flaw: it treats consent solely as a

Id.
Id.
8 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case] (announcing that
contrary practice would be treated as confirming the existence of custom if
defended consistently with a putative rule).
9 See Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L
L. 291, 292 (2006) (detailing efforts to expand the category of jus cogens norms with
little or no evidence of general acceptance by the international community as
such).
10 See infra notes 97–116 and accompanying text (describing uses of this
approach by human rights adjudicatory bodies).
11 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24 (52): General
Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or
Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to
Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, 52d Sess., Nov. 2, 1994, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 11, 1994) (claiming the right to sever invalid
reservations while leaving State bound to the original treaty provision).
6
7
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protection of States’ rights in opposition to human rights. In fact,
State consent is critical to the protection of human rights.
The consent principle protects the collective right to selfdetermination. The right to self-determination grants all peoples a
continuing entitlement to use their respective States to self-direct
development free from external intervention.12 This right reflects
the intrinsic value that communities who share a common life
place on self-government as a vehicle to make decisions about how
to develop as a society.13 Consent protects self-determination
because it gives the people of the State the right to decide which
international human rights obligations to accept, which in turn
conditions the manner in which society develops.14
This connection between consent and self-determination is
important for two reasons. First, consent is both an aid and an
impediment to the protection of human rights. While the latter is
well accounted for in human rights scholarship, the former is not.
Second, because the consent principle is an essential component of
the human right to self-determination, infringements upon the
principle must be supported by a legitimate human rights reason
and be proportionate to that reason. Such analysis is rarely, if ever,
conducted by those advocating for diminishment of the consent
principle.
Proportionality analysis reveals two important realities about
existing practice. First, the only accepted human rights rationale
within practice to date for restricting self-determination is the need
to enforce accepted community obligations on outlier States.
12 Self-determination is a treaty-based right located in both Covenants. See
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, para. 1, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (“All peoples have the right of selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, para. 1,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (containing the same language
as appears in Article 1(1) of the ICCPR). Given that most States of the world are
parties to either the ICCPR or ICESCR, the self-determination right described
herein applies to most States. Though there are strong arguments that the
conception of self-determination described here is also customary, this Article
does not take on the task of proving that this is so.
13 See infra notes 155–59 and accompanying text (describing philosophical
underpinnings of self-determination).
14 See James Crawford, Democracy and International Law, 64 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
113, 121 (1993) (claiming a heightened interest for popular participation on human
rights questions given their impact on the internal life of the State).
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Though some of the restrictions on self-determination described in
this Article advance this accepted rationale, others do not. Where
there is no accepted community obligation at stake, those
interested in restricting consent must identify an alternative
human rights justification. This Article explores some alternatives.
Second, the strength of the justification required to restrict selfdetermination varies depending upon the extent to which the
consent principle is constricted. The developments in human
rights lawmaking described here vary greatly in terms of their
level of infringement on self-determination and, therefore, the
strength of the human rights rationale needed to support the
restriction.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part 1 lays out the
problems associated with the application of the consent principle
to human rights law. Part 2 argues that this conventional account
should be reconsidered given that State consent is essential to the
protection of the human right to self-determination. Part 3 argues
that aspects of human rights practice should be reconsidered in
light of this important role for State consent.
2.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONSENT PROBLEM

This Part undertakes four tasks. First, it describes the
traditional State sovereignty driven account of consent in
international lawmaking. Second, it explains why and how this
account has been challenged by the emergence of human rights as
a central guiding principle of the international system. Third, this
Part describes efforts to ameliorate these concerns. Fourth, it
examines the scholarly critiques of these reform efforts.
2.1. The Consent Principle
There is no more axiomatic rule in international law than the
consent principle propounded by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Lotus Case: a State is bound only by
those international legal obligations to which it consents.15 This
rule emanates from a natural law conception of States: States, like
men, are free, independent and equal entities in the state of
15 See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) (“The
rules of law binding upon States . . . emanate from their own free will . . . .
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.”).
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nature.16 As such, States possess rights by virtue of being States,
the bundle of which constitute international legal sovereignty.17
Sovereignty includes recognition that States as autonomous entities
have the right to decide whether to surrender a portion of their
natural freedom and enter into international obligations.18 Consent
is a marker of the State’s agreement to limit its autonomy pursuant
to a commitment to the international community.19
In practice, this account of international law is incomplete.
Treaties and customary law respect State consent in different ways,
and customary law in particular has nonconsensual elements.
States create treaty obligations through their affirmative
consent.20 States use reservations to modify the content of the
treaty obligation to match their consent.21
Reservations to
multilateral human rights treaties are permissible so long as they

EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS xiii (Joseph Chitty ed., 1863).
See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 14 (1999)
(explaining that international legal sovereignty is derived from Vattel’s concept of
equal States living together in the state of nature). State sovereignty remains the
formal guiding principle of the international legal system. See U.N. Charter art. 2,
para. 1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its Members.”); id. at art. 2, para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . .”).
18 See Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values, and Functions, 216
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 26–29 (1989) (“State autonomy suggests that a State is not
subject to any external authority unless it has voluntarily consented to such
authority.”); see also Ambassador Richard N. Haass, Director, State Dep’t Policy
Planning Staff, Remarks to the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center
for International Studies at Georgetown University: Sovereignty: Existing Rights,
Evolving Responsibilities (Jan. 14, 2003) available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/
/p/rem/2003/16648.htm (describing the attributes of sovereignty in a postWestphalian world).
19 Consent is manifested through formal mechanisms, such as signature of
the treaty or exchange of instruments of ratification. See Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties art. 11, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]
(“The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature,
exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, or by any other means if so agreed.”).
20 See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, at 21 (May 28)
[hereinafter Genocide Convention Case] (“It is well established that in its treaty
relations a State cannot be bound without its consent . . . .”).
21 VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 1(d) (defining “reservation”).
16
17
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do not violate the object and purpose of the treaty.22 Where a
reservation is invalid, the reserving State is not bound by the
provision without the reservation because it never consented to
such an obligation.23 Rather, it is either not party to the treaty in its
entirety, or simply not party to the provision with the disputed
reservation.
Traditional customary norms are located through uniform,
extensive, and widespread state practice done with a sense of legal
obligation (opinio juris). Those States engaging in practice that
leads to custom affirmatively consent to the norm by opting to act
consistently with the rule.24 Customary law does not merely
obligate those States participating in the norm creation, however,
as all non-persistently objecting States are bound. But not all States
contribute practice relevant to the creation of each customary
norm. Sometimes States do not confront the issue that is the
subject of the custom. In other situations, the State may not have
come into being until after the norm was formed. States in those
situations are bound by the customs absent persistent objection,
thus creating an obligation without affirmative consent.
The doctrine of tacit consent presumes consent from a failure to
dissent from the norm.25 States can dissent from the formation of
custom in two ways. First, groups of States can prevent the
formation of putative customary norms through contrary

22 Id. at art. 19(c); Genocide Convention Case, supra note 20, at 24 (“The object
and purpose of the Convention . . . limit . . . the freedom of making reservations . .
. .”).
23 States
generally self-police whether their reservations meet this
requirement. A reservation to a multilateral human rights treaty is valid as long
as at least one other party to the treaty does not object to the reservation; if all
State parties object—exceedingly unlikely with a multilateral human rights
treaty—the reserving State is not a party to the treaty. See VCLT, supra note 19, at
art. 20(4)(c), (5). Any particular State that objects to a reservation is free to decide
that the treaty is not in force between it and the reserving State. See id. at art
20(4)(b) (“An objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not
preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving
States unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State . . .
.”).
24 See INT’L LAW ASS’N, LONDON CONFERENCE (2000), FINAL REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2000) (explaining that those States whose
practice initiates the formation of custom consent to be bound by the rule).
25 See id. (explaining tacit consent theory).
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practice.26 Contrary practice defeats the conclusion that a norm is
custom if it is sufficient to disprove uniform, widespread, and
extensive practice. Second, traditional custom permits an outlier
State—whose action in contradiction to the rule is insufficient to
prevent the formation of custom—to block application of a
customary rule to itself by openly and persistently objecting to the
rule at the time it is created.27
The fit between customary law and the consent principle is
imperfect, however. Jus cogens or peremptory norms are in some
instances nonconsensual. The VCLT defines a peremptory norm as
“a norm accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm
of general international law having the same character.”28 Given
that the test for a norm achieving peremptory status is general
acceptance by the international community, there is by definition
an element of consent in its achieving elevated status.29
But general acceptance does not mean each and every State has
consented. Once a norm achieves jus cogens status, dissenting
States lose the right to remain outside the norm through persistent
objection. As a consequence, it is possible that a jus cogens norm
will bind a State that affirmatively indicated a desire not to be
bound by the norm. For example, once the apartheid norm became
peremptory, it bound South Africa and Rhodesia, even if they were
persistent objectors to such a norm in the past.30
Moreover, the doctrine of tacit consent appears illusory. The
tacit consent doctrine presumes States agree to customary norms
when assuming statehood because acceptance of customary law is
an inherent part of being a State.31 But assuming people within a
26 See id. at 9 n.21 (“[C]ontrary practice can undermine and, if sufficiently
constant and widespread, destroy an existing customary rule.”).
27 See id. at 27 (affirming validity of persistent objector rule).
28 VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 53.
29 See Henkin, supra note 18, at 61 (1989) (describing “authentic systemic
consent”).
30 See Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of
Customary International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 15 (1985) (analyzing why the
jus cogens prohibition on apartheid bound South Africa and Rhodesia despite their
apparent persistent objection).
31 See ANTHONY D’AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 13–25
(1987) (explaining customary norms are inherited obligations required to
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State opted out of statehood to avoid a customary norm, whichever
State is sovereign over those people and within that territory
would nevertheless be bound by the norm.32 Thus, new State or
not, all people reside within the jurisdiction of a sovereign bound
by the norm, rendering consent illusory. Similar criticism can be
made toward attributing tacit consent to States who were unaware
entirely of the formation of a custom until after it was formed.33
Lack of knowledge about putative customary law is not equivalent
to consent.
These two areas of practice demonstrate inconsistencies with
respect to the role of State consent in traditional international legal
theory and practice. An accurate rendition of the consent principle
provides that State consent is the primary and typical route by
which international legal obligations are created with limited
departures in customary law.
2.2. Human Rights Criticism of the Consent Principle
Human rights scholars challenge the consent principle as an
impediment to the protection of human rights. Human rights
theory provides that humans, not States, ought to be the central
animating figures of international law.34 The State is not a true
person of course, and its anthropomorphic characterization misses
participate in the international order); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 44–45 (1995) (describing these rules as
associative obligations of participation in the international system).
32 See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA.
J. INT’L L. 449, 513 (2000) (stating inconsistencies in customary practice).
33 See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529,
537 (1993) (criticizing the practice of giving weight to State silence when “many
states do not know that the law is being made and thus have not formed an
opinion”).
34 See, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY AND SELF-DETERMINATION:
MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 289–327 (Will Kymlicka et al. eds.,
2004) (arguing that a justice-based account of legitimacy oriented around
protection of human rights should replace State sovereignty as the legitimating
principle for international law); FERNANDO R. TESÓN, A PHILOSOPHY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1998) (describing shift in focus of the international legal
system based upon an acceptance that internal legitimacy of States to people
should be the foundation of respect for State sovereignty). Anne Peters goes still
further, arguing that the contest between State sovereignty and human rights as
the “Grundnorm” for international law has been resolved in favor of human
rights. Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513,
514 (2009).
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why States matter: they are primarily discretionary associations
that exist to advance the interests of their people. As such, State
sovereignty is valuable only for the instrumental benefits it
provides for the protection of human rights.35
The diminishment of the importance of sovereignty within
human rights theory undermines the foundations of the consent
principle. While a primarily voluntary legal system protects States’
rights, that goal is less salient as sovereignty wanes in importance.
As critically, the consent requirement arguably impedes the
protection of human rights in at least three ways.
First, the consent principle results in international human
rights regulation akin to a thin slice of Swiss cheese. It contains
holes in coverage because a State or group of States may decline to
consent to an otherwise widely agreed-to treaty norm, or may
block application of a custom to it through persistent objection.
The regulations that do exist are characterized by a “relative lack of
normativity,” in order to foster consensus between widely
divergent cultures and self-interested governments.36
Consider, for example, the mandate found in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that States
criminally prohibit hate speech that amounts to incitement of
discrimination, hostility, or violence.37 Some States like China are
not parties to the ICCPR at all; others, like the United States, have
taken a reservation to the treaty that restricts the application of the
provision within its territory.38 Thus, there are geographic spaces
where this provision does not apply.
35 See TESÓN, supra note 34, at 40 (arguing that sovereignty is valuable for its
instrumental benefits in protecting human rights and has moral weight only with
respect to States that are internally legitimate); Peters, supra note 34, at 514 (“State
sovereignty . . . has a legal value only to the extent that it respects human rights,
interests, and needs.”).
36 See Philip Alston, Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW xi, xii (Philip Alston
ed., 1996) (providing standard critique of human rights law).
37 See ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 20, para. 2 (“Any advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence shall be prohibited by law.”).
38 The U.S. reservation excludes any obligation to pass criminal laws
inconsistent with the First Amendment to U.S. Constitution. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/I
V-4.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2013) (providing a full record of all U.S.
reservations to the ICCPR).
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Moreover, the terms like “national, racial, or religious hatred”
are subject to divergent interpretations, especially given cultural
differences.39 This vagueness gives States wide interpretative
latitude over the content of human rights norms.40 While such
vagueness is frequently characteristic of rights generally,
municipal legal systems include adjudicatory institutions whose
job it is to fill gaps in statutory and constitutional language.41 By
contrast, the ICCPR creates no adjudicatory institution with a
mandate to provide a binding interpretation of what these terms
mean for the Parties.42 The result is that States have such wide
interpretative discretion that most or all conduct may conceivably
be defended as consistent with the rule.
A relatively thin, gap-riddled international human rights
regulatory scheme protects States’ rights. Geographic gaps in
coverage respect the right of the sovereign in that territory to opt
out of international regulation. The thinness of the norms
preserves States’ flexibility in application of the norms.
But such a system has normative problems from the
perspective of the protection of human rights. It prevents
realization of universal human rights, a core objective of the
human rights movement,43 because the same right means different
things in different places.44

39 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 20, para. 20. See Bruno Simma, International
Human Rights and General International Law: A Comparative Analysis, in IV
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE EUROPEAN ACADEMY 153, 188 (1995) (arguing that
cultural diversity among treaty parties makes a shared meaning for treaty terms
hard to find).
40 See Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International
Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 60–63 (2003) (“[T]he relatively open
meaning of the basic norms of international human rights law leaves a great deal
of interpretive latitude to states.”).
41 See Harlan Grant Cohen, International Law’s Erie Moment, 34 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 249, 250–55 (2013) (contrasting acceptance that municipal courts will engage in
gap filling with concerns about international adjudicatory institutions engaging in
similar activities).
42 As discussed later, the ICCPR creates a Human Rights Committee to
monitor State compliance, which has at times asserted a right to play this role,
although such a role was not formally granted in the treaty. See NOWAK, infra note
82, at 668–69 (characterizing the Human Rights Committee as a “quasi-judicial
organ” in large part due to its "lack of internationally binding effect").
43 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 2, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as
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It may also provide insufficient protection to people from
abuse by States. States can exploit gaps in the law to abuse
people.45 The United States, for example, used the existence of
gaps in the legal framework governing conflicts with non-State
actors to arguably torture detainees in its conflict with al Qaida.46
Preventing such abuses from occurring is a core objective of the
human rights movement.
Second, the consent principle slows the pace of development of
human rights norms. The traditional international lawmaking
mechanism has an inherent “status quo bias” because of the
hurdles that exist with respect to creating new law or altering
existing law.47 This bias is particularly stark with respect to human
rights.
Securing consensus between groups of States on new human
rights treaty obligations is a cumbersome process due to deep
cultural differences that exist with respect to the practices that are
the subject of human rights norms. Once treaties exist, any
amendments must be approved by a State party before it is bound,
which empowers laggard States to resist changes unless their
particular concerns are addressed.48
Though the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties allows regular practice between
treaty parties to modify the meaning of a treaty without new

race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.”).
44 See Fernando R. Tesón, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism,
25 VA. J. INT’L L. 869, 877–79 (1985) (worrying that “international human rights”
loses its meaning if it means different things in different places).
45 See Louis Henkin, Univ. Professor Emeritus & Special Serv. Professor,
Columbia Univ., That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human
Rights, Et Cetera, Address at Fordham University School of Law (Feb. 23, 1999), in
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 12 (1999) (condemning States who abuse gaps in law made
possible by sovereignty to commit atrocities).
46 See John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in
Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing
Law, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 204 (2011) (describing risks inherent in acknowledging
gaps in international law).
47 See Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Common Law:
The Soft Law of International Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 515, 525–26 (2009) (arguing
that a desire to overcome this bias partially explains the use of “soft law”).
48 See VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 40, para. 4 (“The amending agreement does
not bind any State already a party to the treaty which does not become a party to
the amending agreement . . . .”).
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negotiations,49 there is limited inter-State practice on human rights
questions because most human rights activity takes place within
the State.50
The process of locating new customary norms is even slower.51
Demonstrating that there is a pattern of uniform, widespread, and
extensive State practice with respect to a human rights norm will
take significant time, both to actually develop and to be
documented by the actor seeking to establish a custom. The pace
may be further retarded by the search for evidence of opinio juris,
separate and apart from the consistent practice.52
This slow pace of legal development is a function of a system
oriented toward protecting States’ rights.
States make a
momentous choice when opting to surrender a portion of their
domestic sovereignty to international regulation, especially where
the issue in question is the relationship between the government
and its people. They must be afforded proper time to make this
decision.
But a slow pace of evolution potentially harms the protection of
human rights. Human rights terms, perhaps more than other
kinds of treaty terms, acquire different meanings over time.53 For
example, the meaning of “cruel, inhuman or degrading,”54 by
definition is not static, as practices once widely accepted are later
viewed as barbaric and inconsistent with human rights. Allowing
49 See VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 31, para. 3 (attributing weight in treaty
interpretation to subsequent practice between treaty parties).
50 See Simma, supra note 39, at 187–88 (describing lack of practice). Most
practice, such that it is, consists of statements made at bodies like the Human
Rights Council and the Third Committee.
51 See Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided
World, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 513, 514 (R. St.J. Macdonald & Douglas M.
Johnston eds., 1983) (quoting Sir Robert Jennings) (“Customary law . . . is based
upon the passage of a long period of time . . . .”).
52 See John B. Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response
to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International
Humanitarian Law, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 443, 446–47 (2007) (arguing that ICRC
erred in conflating state practice and opinio juris in its customary IHL study).
53 See Andrew Drzemczewski, The Sui Generis Nature of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 29 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 54, 61–62 (1980) (describing the
ECHR as evolving).
54 See generally United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85;
ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 7.
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States to perpetrate conduct widely considered cruel today because
such conduct was viewed as permissible at earlier points in time is
difficult to reconcile with the purpose of protecting human rights.55
2.3. Loosening the Consent Principle
Given these tensions between State consent and international
human rights, it is not surprising that many scholars, human rights
advocates, and human rights institutions have sought to loosen the
consent requirement. This Part describes these efforts.
2.3.1. Customary Law
Though there has always been a nonconsensual element to
customary law, the ability of States to dissent from customary
norms is on the wane. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has
promulgated a rule, now widely accepted, that makes it harder for
States to dissent from putative customary law through contrary
behavior.56
Under traditional doctrine, all instances of contrary State
practice are accounted for in determining whether widespread,
uniform practice fueled by opinio juris exists to create customary
law.57 This rule has made it difficult for human rights custom to
form because large amounts of contradictory State practice exist
even with respect to the most sacred human rights, such as the
prohibition on torture.58
Such a rule protects the right of States to dissent from
customary law through practice. But it appears not to protect
human rights. Customary law provides a unique opportunity to
bind all States to any particular norm, given the risk that some
55 See Drzemczewski, supra note 53, at 62 (arguing ECHR needs to evolve to
“keep pace with social and legal advances made within the domestic legal
structures of member States”).
56 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the ICJ’s holding in the
Nicaragua Case).
57 The methodology for determining whether a practice is customary law is
to look for “extensive and virtually uniform” State practice to support a custom.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb. 20). States
may try and alter customary law by engaging in contrary practice, but such
practice must also “obtain[] the acquiescence of others” or be incorporated into a
treaty amendment for it to supplant custom. INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 24, at 25.
58 See Bellinger & Padmanabhan, supra note 46, at 212–13 (describing
difficulties inherent in locating human rights custom).
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number of States will choose not to join any particular human
rights treaty. Thus, the harder it is to create customary law, the
more likely it is that there will be geographic gaps in human rights
protection. Moreover, the traditional rule enshrines a slow pace
for legal development given the indefinite and perhaps infinite
time it will take for the world’s States to arrive at widespread,
extensive, and uniform practice with respect to any human rights
question.
The ICJ sought to modify this rule in the Nicaragua Case.59 In
that case, the Court evaluated whether the prohibition on the use
of force and intervention in the internal affairs of other States,
found in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, is customary law.60 There
are many examples of States violating the literal terms of Article
2(4), making it difficult to establish customary law under the
traditional test.61 But the ICJ announced that inconsistent State
practice should be treated as a violation of the custom, as opposed
to evidence that no custom exists, if the State justifies its conduct
consistently with the custom.62
While this ruling was made in the context of the law governing
armed conflict, its impact has been felt more intensely in
international human rights law. The ability of States to dissent
from a putative human rights custom through contrary behavior is

59 The powers of the ICJ are limited to deciding disputes between States, and
it has no formal authority to alter rules on the formation of custom. Statute of the
International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 3 U.S.T. 1153 [hereinafter ICJ
Statute] (“The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case.”). But the ICJ approach in the
Nicaragua Case has been widely adopted by States and scholars as the method for
evaluating contrary practice in the context of human rights and humanitarian
norms. See, e.g., Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian
Law: A Response to US Comments, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 473, 478–86 (2007)
(arguing application of Nicaragua rule is essential to prevent “violators [from]
dictat[ing] the law or stand[ing] in the way of rules emerging”).
60 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
61 Indeed, the Court in the Nicaragua Case itself found that the United States
and Nicaragua both violated Article 2(4) of the Charter by providing weapons
and logistical support to rebel groups in Nicaragua and El Salvador, respectively.
Nicaragua Case, supra note 8, ¶ 195.
62 Id. ¶ 187 (finding that the content of Article 2(4) was indeed customary
law).
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significantly compromised.
Rather than contrary practice
registering dissent, States’ explanations of their actions are also
evaluated.
On the surface, this change may not appear dramatic; if a State
does not believe a rule exists, why would it attempt to defend its
action consistent with the putative rule? In reality, States have
political or economic reasons to describe their conduct in a manner
that is pleasing to the international community, which are
unrelated to accepting the existence of a legal obligation.63
Requiring States to disavow those contrary policy objectives in
order to dissent from creation of a customary norm imposes
potentially significant additional costs on dissent.
Consider the sometimes proclaimed customary duty to
prosecute those involved in international crimes, such as genocide,
crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes. Scholars have
described this duty as customary64 despite the regularity with
which States have granted amnesties to those who allegedly
committed such crimes.65 They make this claim by using the
Nicaragua rule to convert the contrary practice of States into a form
of consent to the rule. These scholars argue that if a State granting
amnesty
invokes
exigent
circumstances—like
national
reconciliation or fragility of the democratic transition—to explain
amnesties, they are implicitly accepting that they need to explain
deviations from the rule.66 Why else would they feel the need to
offer an explanation for choosing amnesties over prosecutions?
63 See Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 52, at 445 (explaining that States will
verbally support resolutions at international organizations for reasons that have
nothing to do with judgment on the existence of a legal norm).
64 See, e.g., Carla Edelenbos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?, 7
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 5, 15–16 (1994) (arguing there is customary duty to prosecute war
crimes and crimes against humanity and a developing custom with respect to
human rights violations); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Comment, State Responsibility to
Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL.
L. REV. 449, 489 (1990) (describing an “emerging” customary duty to prosecute).
65 See Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a Second Chance, 25 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 283, 295–99 (2007) (marshaling significant evidence of States’ practices
which are inconsistent with the existence of a customary duty).
66 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 64, at 496–97 (dismissing amnesties offered by
Uruguay, Chile, and El Salvador as contrary practice disproving a customary duty
to prosecute); see also Edelenbos, supra note 64, at 21 (making general point). But
see Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal
Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 58
(1996) (disputing factual accuracy of claim).
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But, in reality, such States may not accept a duty to prosecute.
States which use amnesties may have felt constrained not to openly
reject the existence of a duty to prosecute because they feared that
departures from a pro-human rights stance would disrupt Western
aid upon which the States were dependent. Thus, even though
their statements acknowledge that Western States might view a
duty to prosecute as customary, they may not be a statement of
agreement to that effect. Alternatively, States simply may have
been offering reasons why they opted for one policy over another,
with no intention of accepting any legal obligation. Requiring
States to forego those policy or economic benefits to record dissent
from the duty to prosecute imposes a significant new burden on
the consent principle.67
International human rights practice has also seen a dramatic
increase in claims from scholars and advocates that human rights
are peremptory, and therefore bind even dissenting States. The
persistent objection rule in customary law protects the consent
principle by giving States the right to opt out of customs with
which they disagree through timely, persistent, and open objection
to the rule.68 As described in Part 1.1, the consent principle
recognizes a limited exception to this rule in the case of
peremptory norms, identified as such by their recognition and
acceptance by the international community of States.69 The
existence of this exception reflects willingness, even in the
sovereignty-driven account of consent, to recognize that a small
number of peremptory norms will trump the sovereign right of
individual States to control the content of their international legal
obligations.

67 Bruno Simma argues that the Nicaragua rule is justifiable when evaluating
practice that is inconsistent with an existing rule of custom, but far less sensible
when examining practice to determine whether there is custom in the first place.
Simma, supra note 39, at 220. The diminishment of the consent principle only
arises in the latter circumstance. States have traditionally enjoyed the ability to
dissent from the formation of custom through contrary practice, a right made
more difficult by this rule. By contrast, once a rule is formed, States have no right
to dissent through contrary practice, as such conduct would be a violation of the
rule until sufficient practice has accumulated to defeat the conclusion that the rule
still exists.
68 See supra Section 2.1 (discussing the foundation of the consent principle
and the persistent objector rule).
69 See VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 53 (defining peremptory norm).
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But an important benefit accrues for the protection of
international human rights from increasing the number of
peremptory norms. Jus cogens norms solve the problem of
geographic gaps in coverage because they are by definition
applicable globally, not providing States the opportunity to dissent
through persistent objection.70 Not surprisingly then, human
rights advocates and scholars have created a cottage industry in
proclaiming human rights norms jus cogens.71
Some notable human rights scholars contend that all human
rights are jus cogens.72 Other scholars, taking a slightly more
restrained view, have argued that a wide range of human rights
norms are jus cogens, including the duty to assassinate political
leaders in certain circumstances,73 the right to development,74 and
the right to free trade.75
In making these pronouncements, scholars and activists must
wrestle with the difficulty of establishing that a particular norm or
body of norms is generally accepted and recognized as peremptory
70 Jonathan Charney made a more direct effort at restricting the right of
persistent objection, arguing that persistent objection be permitted only during
the period before a custom is formed. If that objection was insufficient to prevent
the formation of custom, even those States, which had been in persistent and open
objection to the norm, should be bound, he contended. Charney, supra note 30, at
22. Professor Charney’s argument has not been widely adopted, however. See
INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 24, at 27 (confirming existence of persistent objector
rule despite scholarly criticism).
71 Prosper Weil predicted this outcome in 1983, stating “virtually nothing . . .
prevent[s] an irresistible tide of rules of general international law from swelling,
one after another, [into] the category of high grade norms . . . .” Prosper Weil,
Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 427 (1983).
72 See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 31, 38–39 (1995–96) (arguing all of human rights law is jus cogens to
which persistent objection does not apply); Simma, supra note 39, at 229–230
(asserting persistent objection is inconsistent with the structure of human rights).
73 See Louis René Beres, Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes Against Israel During the Gulf
War: Jerusalem’s Rights Under International Law, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 337, 357–
58 (1992) (arguing Israel may have a jus cogens duty to assassinate Saddam
Hussein).
74 See Shashank Upadhye, The International Watercourse: An Exploitable
Resource for the Developing Nation Under International Law?, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 61, 66–68 (2000) (citing to General Assembly resolutions to support this
claim).
75 Michael H. Allen, Globalization and Peremptory Norms in International Law:
From Westphalian to Global Constitutionalism?, 41 INT’L POL. 341, 342 (2004)
(commenting on how the “the problem of markets has produced a new
peremptory norm, that of Free Trade”).
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by the international community of States as a whole. Scholars and
activists often have asserted that norms fall into this category
without the presentation of much—or any—evidence that there is
general support in the international community for treating the
norms as such.76
As an example consider again the customary duty to prosecute.
Some scholars argue that this duty is not only customary, but also
jus cogens and thereby not subject to persistent objection.77 But they
do so without providing evidence that there is general acceptance
in the international community that this duty is non-derogable. M.
Cherif Bassiouni, for example, asserts the duty to prosecute is
“inderogable” and “mandatory” based upon the conclusions of the
international community that crimes which are the subject of the
duty are peremptory limitations on State power.78 Bassiouni
makes no effort to catalog evidence that the duty to prosecute itself
is viewed as peremptory by States.
While many States have engaged in practice inconsistent with
the norm historically, in recent years African States have openly
challenged the legal status of the duty to prosecute. These States
argue that such a duty impedes peace, and have pushed to
reconsider the role of amnesties in transitional societies.79
Amnesties issued by such States would count against the existence
of custom even under the Nicaragua rule because the contrary
practice is accompanied by verbal rejection of the custom. But if
characterized as jus cogens, amnesties issued by African States are
simply illegal under international law because persistent objection
is not recognized. The result is that geographic gaps in coverage of

76 See Shelton, supra note 9, at 292 (criticizing the practice of writers and
international tribunals to assert norms as peremptory “without presenting any
evidence”).
77 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Justice: The Need for
Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 17 (1996) (arguing that jus cogens
nature of crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and torture creates a jus
cogens duty to prosecute); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537, 2608–09
(1990–1991) (describing the ways in which a position permitting derogations from
the duty to prosecute is “untenable”).
78 Bassiouni, supra note 77, at 17.
79 See Vijay M. Padmanabhan, From Rome to Kampala: The U.S. Approach to the
2010 International Criminal Court Review Conference, 55 COUNCIL SPEC. REP. 3, 18
(describing concerns of African States at the 2010 ICC Review Conference).
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human rights norms are closed at the cost of the right of States to
dissent from such norms.
2.3.2. Treaty Law
Unlike customary law, treaty law has traditionally epitomized
the consent principle—States only have those treaty obligations to
which they have consented. But TMB and human rights courts
have used techniques in interpreting their treaties that diminish the
consent principle.
Human rights treaties have created a range of institutions to
monitor treaty compliance and/or adjudicate disputes arising
under treaties. Most U.N. sponsored international human rights
treaties have TMB, which are empowered to monitor State
compliance with the treaties.80 In the course of their duties, TMB
issue concluding observations regarding State performance with
the treaty, general comments regarding interpretation of the treaty,
and, in some cases, views on disputes regarding compliance with
the treaty raised by private actors and States.81 As a formal matter,
TMB have not been given lawmaking authority.82 But as a
practical matter, their treaty interpretations are very influential in
shaping States’ understandings with regard to their obligations
under the treaty.
The International Law Association found that most States,
while rejecting any formal lawmaking authority for TMB, in
practice use the interpretation provided by TMB as the applicable
legal standard, whether in reporting on compliance to the TMB or
in interpreting the treaty in their national courts.83 Even in the rare
80 There are currently eight human rights treaty monitoring bodies with a
ninth body, covering disabilities, slated to come into existence. See Kerstin
Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 905, 914 (2009) (listing the human rights treaty monitoring bodies).
81 See Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. HUM. RTS.: OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R
FOR HUM. RTS., http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/treaty/index.htm (last
visited Nov. 2, 2012) (describing three primary functions of treaty bodies as
concluding observations, communications, and general comments).
82 The ICCPR parties, for example, intended the HRC to play a supporting
role in assisting the Parties in implementing the treaty, not a court-like legal
development role. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 669 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining the decision to name the
HRC a “committee” instead of a “court” or “tribunal”).
83 INT’L LAW ASS’N, BERLIN CONFERENCE (2004), FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT
OF FINDINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES 631–57 (2004).
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instances where a State puts forward an alternative interpretation,
the TMB interpretation is used as a baseline for a dialogue with the
State on the nature of the obligation in question.84
Some regional human rights instruments have created human
rights courts with jurisdiction to hear disputes arising under the
treaty.85 Unlike TMB, the pronouncements of these courts are
binding with respect to the parties to the case.86 The decisions of
these courts are not formally binding on other parties to the
treaty.87 But the likelihood that subsequent cases will be brought
against the State parties resulting in a similar outcome creates an
even stronger impetus for compliance by all parties than TMB
interpretations.88
The traditional approach to treaty interpretation uses the
expectations of the State parties to the treaty as the touchstone for
interpretation.89 Such a rule protects State sovereignty by leaving
84 For example, while the United States disagrees with the HRC’s
interpretation of the ICCPR as covering extraterritorial conduct, it nevertheless
provides information to it on such conduct. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SECOND AND
THIRD PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UN COMMITTEE
ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS annex 1 (Oct. 21, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl
/rls /55504.htm (providing information on activities outside the territorial United
States “as a courtesy matter”). Doing so spawned an iterative dialogue between
the United States and the HRC on U.S. extraterritorial activities that mirrored the
dialogue on activities taking place in the United States.
85 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 19, Nov. 9, 9150, 1950 C.E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter “ECHR”] (establishing the European Court of Human Rights);
American Convention on Human Rights art. 33, 52, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M 673
(1970) [hereinafter “American Convention”] (creating the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights).
86 See ECHR, supra note 85, at art. 46(1) (describing the jurisdiction of these
courts as “compulsory” in “all matters concerning the interpretation and
application of the present Convention”); American Convention, supra note 85, at
art. 68(1) (“The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.”).
87 See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 85, at art. 68(1) (affirming that
only States party to a decision are bound by it).
88 See Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal
Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe, 67 INT’L ORG. (forthcoming 2013)
(arguing that gay rights decisions by the ECtHR have influenced policies of States
that are not parties to the decision).
89 Such an approach is not the same as an originalist approach to treaty
interpretation. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which employs a
consent-based approach to treaty interpretation, requires treaties be interpreted as
the parties would agree today. To that end, while the negotiating history of the
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in the hands of States alone the creation and modification of treaty
obligations. It is incumbent upon non-State institutions engaged in
treaty interpretation to display fealty to State expectations so as to
avoid infringing on State autonomy.
But such an interpretative technique is dissonant with a system
oriented around the protection of human rights, as discussed in
Part 2.2. Securing consensus on treaty terms requires negotiating
terms that are open-ended and vague, with wide latitude in
implementation. Simply applying the provisions as drafted might
result in little restriction on State conduct.
Fealty to the
expectations of the State parties will also retard the evolution of
human rights treaty terms, given the paucity of inter-State practice
available to alter the original meaning of the terms.
To ameliorate these concerns, human rights bodies engaged in
treaty interpretation often use a teleological approach to
interpretation. Such an approach is based upon the rule in the
VCLT requiring treaties to be interpreted consistently with their
object and purpose—here protecting human rights.90 These bodies
argue that this purpose requires them to employ plausible
interpretations of treaty text that are most favorable to human
rights, as opposed to an interpretation that prioritizes fealty to
State consent.91
Two examples illustrate this approach. First, the Women’s
Committee has used a teleological approach to treaty
interpretation to locate at least a partial right to an abortion within
the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW).92 CEDAW Article 12 provides that “States
treaty is relevant to interpretation, so too are subsequent agreements and interState practice of treaty parties. VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 31(3).
90 VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 31(1) (requiring treaties be interpreted in light
of their “object and purpose”).
91 See, e.g., MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 3
(Ian Brownlie ed., 1995) (describing the approach taken by the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
92 The HRC has also engaged in a teleological approach to treaty
interpretation on the abortion question. It has interpreted Articles 7 and 17 of the
ICCPR to require States to provide at least a medical exception to abortion laws.
Llantoy Huamán v. Peru, Commc’n No. 1153/2003, ¶ 6.3–6.4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Nov. 22, 2005). It has done
so despite strong evidence that these provisions were not intended to cover
abortion rights. There was an intense debate about abortion in the context of
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Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health
care services, including those related to family planning.”93
There is strong evidence that the States negotiating this Article
did not intend to eliminate laws criminalizing abortion. States
specifically rejected including the phrase “family planning
services” within Article 12, because they feared that phrase would
bring abortion into the article’s ambit, thereby hurting ratification
rates.94 Moreover, States with restrictive abortion laws ratified the
treaty without reservation to Article 12, which they would likely
not have done if they thought the provisions implicated abortion.95
Other States have, in their dialogue with the Women’s Committee,
rejected the argument that Article 12 has implications for
abortion.96 There was also no subsequent practice or agreement
between the Parties modifying Article 12.97
Despite the evidence that States did not intend to cover
abortion within Article 12, and the absence of subsequent practice
modifying the treaty, the Women’s Committee has nevertheless
interpreted it to confer abortion rights. In its General
Article 6. See NOWAK, supra note 82, at 153–55 (describing debate regarding
whether Article 6 “life” begins at conception). The absence of such a debate in the
context of Articles 7 and 17, as well as the decision of States with total abortion
bans to join those provisions without reservation, suggests strongly that these
provisions were not intended to have abortion implications.
93 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women art. 12(1), adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
94 See LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN 145 (1993) (noting the rejection of the term “family planning
services”).
95 See DOUGLAS A. SYLVA & SUSAN YOSHIHARA, INT’L ORGS. RESEARCH GRP.,
RIGHTS BY STEALTH: THE ROLE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES IN THE
CAMPAIGN FOR AN INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO ABORTION 31–32 (2009), available at
http://c-fam.org/images/WhitePapers/Rights.By.Stealth.pdf (explaining how
States did not construe Article 12 to include reproductive rights).
96 See id. at 42–44 (describing efforts by treaty bodies to use expansive
interpretations of treaty provisions to override democratic opposition to legalizing
abortion in Poland, Ireland, Namibia, and Nicaragua).
97 Such subsequent agreements are exceedingly rare in human rights law,
given that most practice is intra-State rather than inter-State. Simma, supra note
39, at 188. Subsequent practice must be inter-State to modify the treaty in order to
comply with the consent principle, as it must reflect a shared, agreed to change in
interpretation of the treaty provisions.
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Recommendation 24, the Women’s Committee explained that
eliminating discrimination against women in the health services
context requires removing legal barriers to women’s medical
procedures, such as abortion.98 Such a requirement led the
Women’s Committee to interpret Article 12 to require States to
repeal “laws that criminalize medical procedures only needed by
women.”99 Specifically, it stated that “legislation criminalizing
abortion should be amended, in order to withdraw punitive
measures imposed on women who undergo abortion,” when
possible.100
Another example of a teleological approach to treaty
interpretation is found within the decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the right of non-refoulement, or right
not to be transferred to face torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment.101 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
does not contain an express non-refoulement provision. Article 3
of the ECHR prohibits torture, but does not make mention of
transfers.102 European States parties have argued that they did not
intend to create a non-refoulement obligation when negotiating
Article 3,103 nor is there evidence that the subject was raised during
the negotiations of the provision.

98 Rep. of the Comm. for Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 20th
Sess., Jan. 19–Feb. 5, 1999, General Recommendation 24, art. 12, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc.
No. A/54/38/Rev.1; GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1999).
99 Id.
100 Id. ¶ 31(c).
101 The HRC has similarly used an evolutionary interpretative approach to
locate a non-refoulement right within Article 7 of the ICCPR. U.N. Human Rights
Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 80th Sess., Mar. 29, 2004, ¶
12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004). It has done so despite
evidence that the Parties never intended for the prohibition on cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment to include a non-refoulement provision. See Vijay M.
Padmanabhan, To Transfer or Not to Transfer: Identifying and Protecting Relevant
Human Rights Interests in Non-Refoulement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 107–112 (2011)
(describing evidence to this effect).
102 See ECHR, supra note 85, at art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
103 Observations of the Governments of Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, & the
United Kingdom in the case of Ramzy v. Netherlands, App. No. 25424/05, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2005), available at http://www.redress.org/Government_intervenors
_observations_in_Ramzy_case%20_21November.pdf.
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Nevertheless, the ECtHR has used a teleological approach to
interpretation to locate within Article 3 non-refoulement
protection. The Court explained that the object and purpose of the
treaty, which is to protect human rights, and “to promote the ideals
and values of a democratic society,” requires expanding Article
3.104 The Court found the Article 3 non-refoulement right to be
absolute, rejecting potential security exceptions.105 It recently
expanded the protection to include the right not to be transferred
to face trial where evidence at that trial may have been obtained
using torture.106
Teleological treaty interpretation is difficult to reconcile with
an international legal system oriented around State sovereignty.107
When institutions depart from indicia of State consent in their
treaty interpretations, they seek to use either their power to issue
binding decisions or the power of the bully pulpit to constrict State

104 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1989) (citation
omitted).
105 Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1855–56 (1996).
106 Othman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8139/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
107 Scholars have made the argument that States in effect consent to human
rights institutions engaging in gap filling when those institutions are given
authority to make binding interpretations of the treaty. See Bruno Simma,
Consent: Strains in the Treaty System, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY, supra
note 51, at 485, 497 (arguing that the open-ended nature of human rights terms
combined with creation of an adjudicatory institution invites judge-driven
lawmaking). Though the creation of these institutions implies consent to some
judge-made law, it is unlikely that parties to treaties like the ECHR intended for
human rights courts to depart from the general rule that the intent of the parties
should be the touchstone for interpretation. The United Kingdom, for example,
has expressed its view that the ECtHR’s non-refoulement jurisprudence exceeds
the Court’s mandate. See John F. Burns, Britain Releases and Curbs Extremist, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2012, at A6 (describing the hostile reaction of Conservative MPs to
ECtHR decision rejecting deportation of a radical Muslim cleric).
Andrew Guzman and Tim Meyer argue there is a division between parties
to human rights treaties as to the extent to which they favor courts assuming a
lawmaking function. They contend that States that wish for greater international
regulation of human rights create international adjudicatory institutions out of the
expectation that these institutions will create jurisprudence that will, overtime,
pressure non-participating States to accept greater levels of international
supervision. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 202 (2010). This theory suggests that some State parties to a
human rights treaty consent to teleological treaty interpretation, while other
parties do not. The constriction of the consent principle occurs with respect to
non-consenting States.
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prerogative in recognizing new international obligations.108 Such
pressure constricts the consent principle to varying extents
depending upon the intensity of coercion behind the effort.
Coercion is greater with human rights courts, who issue binding
judgments, than with TMB.
They do so because of the benefits in ameliorating some of the
concerns about a voluntary human rights system described in Part
1.2. These decisions add a detailed heft to previously thin
provisions, thereby combating normative thinness. They also
allow potentially static treaty provisions to evolve with changing
social expectations, which is unlikely to occur if one were to wait
for States to “update” treaty terms through subsequent agreement
or practice.
One TMB interpretation with particular effect on the consent
principle is the HRC’s jurisprudence on reservations. A persistent
source of irritation in human rights treaty practice for some
scholars and activists is the use of reservations by treaty parties to
alter their obligations arising under treaties.109 Reservations permit
States to join multilateral human rights treaties while undertaking
only those obligations they wish to undertake. While reservations
help increase the number of parties to a human rights treaty,110

108 Thomas Fuller and Abraham Sofaer have argued that when States comply
with TMB pronouncements they implicitly consent to their lawmaking role. See
Thomas C. Fuller & Abraham D. Sofaer, Sovereignty: The Practioners’ Perspective, in
PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 24, 38–39
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001) (arguing that a State’s decision to comply
constitutes consent to the obligation). It is generally the case that States retain
control over whether to comply with treaty obligations, whether through noncompliance or treaty-exit. But it is important not to conflate the prerogative of
compliance with the right to determine the content of international legal
obligations. The former permits noncompliance with international law only with
the stain of law breaking, while the latter avoids that stigma.
109 See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human
Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 347, 351–352 (2000) (accusing the United States of
abusing the use of reservations to avoid providing its people the protections of the
ICCPR); William A. Schabas, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 79, 79–80 (1997) (criticizing reservations to CEDAW
that in effect rob the provisions of practical meaning).
110 See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, at 24 (May 28) (stating
that increasing the number of adherents to the Genocide Convention is one of its
purposes).
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they also incur several burdens of the consent principle identified
in Part 1.2.
Reservations contribute to the ‘thin slice of Swiss cheese’ nature
of human rights regulation. States or groups of States use
reservations to exclude applicability of particular treaty provisions
from their territory and jurisdiction, thereby creating geographic
holes in treaty application. States also use reservations to modify
the content of treaty provisions in order to maximize flexibility for
State compliance. Doing so ‘thins’ out the norms, as it allows a
wide-range of compliant conduct. In so doing, reservations
undermine the general premise of ‘universal’ human rights,
turning them instead into an a la carte menu.
As described in Part 1.1., States are limited in the reservations
they may employ, however, as they must be consistent with the
“object and purpose” of the treaty.111 But in reality, this rule fails
to provide a meaningful restraint on reservations to multilateral
human rights treaties. States rarely police the reservations of other
States to human rights treaties because they are of limited interest
to other States. When they do, the remedy is for the provision or
the treaty itself to not enter into force between the reserving State
and objecting State.112 Because the obligations within the treaty are
not reciprocal, the reserving State suffers no tangible harm if the
provision or treaty is not in force between it and the objecting
State. Meanwhile the people of the reserving State remain without
the protection of the treaty provision as drafted.
Frustrated with the impact of reservations, the HRC announced
in General Comment 24 that where reservations are inconsistent
with the object and purpose of the treaty, it would sever the
reservation and hold the State to the original treaty provision
without the reservation.113

Id. at 29.
See VCLT, supra note 19, at art 20(4)(b) (“An objection by another
contracting State to a reservation does not preclude the entry into force of the
treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary intention is
definitely expressed by the objecting State . . . .”); id. at art. 21(3) (“When a State
objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty
between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation
relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation.”).
113 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 11,
¶ 18.
111
112
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The result is a weaker consent principle. Consider the
experience of Trinidad & Tobago with respect to its reservations to
the Optional Protocol (OP) to the ICCPR. The OP grants the HRC
jurisdiction to hear complaints regarding alleged State violations of
the ICCPR. Trinidad & Tobago joined the OP with a reservation
denying the HRC jurisdiction over petitions by death row
prisoners.114 When a death row prisoner brought a claim to the
HRC alleging a violation of the ICCPR, the HRC heard the claim
despite the reservation.115 The HRC found that the reservation
violated the object and purpose of the treaty, and was invalid and
severed.116 The result is that the HRC exercised jurisdiction over
petitions by death row prisoners despite Trinidad & Tobago’s lack
of consent to it doing so.
From a traditional sovereignty perspective, this outcome is
worrisome as it results in a State being bound to an obligation to
which it did not consent.117 But if the protection of human rights is

114 See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations
Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1871–81 (2002) (providing a detailed history of the reasons for
Trinidad & Tobago’s reservation to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR).
115 See Kennedy v. Trin. & Tobago, Commc’n No. 845/1999, ¶ 6.7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Dec. 31, 1999) (finding the
reservation was inconsistent with the object and purpose of the ICCPR because it
singled out a discrete group for reduced procedural protections for human rights).
116 Id.
117 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 436–37 (2000) (arguing severability is
inconsistent with State consent).
Ryan Goodman makes the admittedly counterintuitive argument that a
rebuttable presumption in favor of severance actually better protects consent
because of the costs of requiring States to re-ratify treaties with invalid
reservations. Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State
Consent, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 531, 536–37 (2002).
Goodman’s argument depends upon two assumptions that are more
protective of consent than the approach of the HRC. First, Goodman argues that
the touchstone for the rebuttable presumption is whether the State intended the
reservation to be an essential condition of ratification. Id. at 536. The HRC makes
no such inquiry. Second, Goodman assumes States can exit from a treaty if the
presumption is applied incorrectly. Id. at 556. By contrast, the HRC views exit
from the ICCPR as impermissible. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 26 (61): General Comment on Issues Relating to the Continuity of
Obligations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 61st Sess.,
Oct. 29, 1997, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997)
(“The Committee is therefore firmly of the view that international law does not

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/1

PADMANABHAN_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2/23/2014 2:54 PM

2013] HUMAN RIGHTS JUSTIFICATION FOR CONSENT

29

the measuring stick, then the HRC approach makes much more
sense.
It reduces the ability of States to employ invalid
reservations—which harm core human rights equities—while
preserving the protections of the treaty more generally.
2.3. Critiques
These developments in human rights practice have been
criticized for inappropriately moving away from State sovereignty
as the foundational principle of international law. If sovereignty,
and not human rights, remains the guiding principle of all
international law including human rights, then efforts to constrict
the consent principle are inappropriate.
The United States has frequently asserted such a position.
During its 2006 presentation regarding U.S. compliance with the
ICCPR, a U.S. official informed the HRC that “[i]t was not for the
Committee to change his country’s obligations flowing from the
Covenant or to issue authoritative guidance in that respect.”118
Consistent with this statement, the United States rejects
recommendations from TMB that create unintended obligations for
the United States because lawmaking is outside the mandate of
TMB.119 Other States, including France120 and the Netherlands,121
have criticized TMB in similar terms.
permit a State which has ratified or acceded or succeeded to the Covenant to
denounce it or withdraw from it.”).
118 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Under Article 40 of
the Covenant: Second and Third Periodic Reports of the United States of America,
87th Sess., July 18, 2007, ¶ 105, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.2380 (July 27, 2006).
119 For example, the Committee against Torture interpreted the Convention
Against Torture’s prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment as
requiring closure of the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. U.N. Comm.
Against Torture, Considerations of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee Against Torture, 36th Sess., May 1–19, 2006, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006). The then-Legal Adviser to the U.S.
Department of State, John Bellinger, responded by rejecting the authority of the
Committee Against Torture to make such a recommendation. See Colum Lynch,
Military Prison’s Closure Is Urged; U.N. Panel Faults Detention Policies, WASH. POST,
May 20, 2006, at A1 (quoting Bellinger stating recommendation is “skewed and
reaches well beyond the scope and mandate of the committee”).
120 See Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., Observations of States Parties
Under Article 40, Paragraph 5, of the Covenant ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/51/40; GAOR,
51st Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1996) (“France points out that the Committee, like any
other treaty body or similar body established by agreement, owes its existence
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A small number of American scholars have backed this
position.122 These scholars argue that many liberal positions
favored by academics and NGOs, but rejected by the U.S.
government, are repackaged as human rights obligations in order
to win otherwise lost battles.123 Under this account, international
human rights law seeks to strip legislative and judicial power away
from Congress and the federal courts124 and place them instead in
the hands of NGOs and the global elite.
John Bolton makes this argument in the context of the duty to
prosecute. Bolton challenges the proposition that a duty to
prosecute is positive for human rights, viewing this effort at
geographic gap filling as an effort to impose the “value
preferences” of academics and activists on unsuspecting States.125
He instead favors leaving the decision to undertake such an
international duty in State hands.126 Bolton explains that such
decisions go to the heart of “national autonomy” properly
protected by State sovereignty, and fears that efforts to undermine

exclusively to the treaty, and has no powers other than those conferred on it by
the States parties . . . .”).
121 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Replies of the Government of the
Netherlands to the Concerns Expressed by the Human Rights Committee in its
Concluding Observations, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/NET/Add.1 (Apr. 29,
2003) (rejecting Committee’s reading of the ICCPR conferring certain
responsibilities to the Netherlands over Srebrenica).
122 See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 205, 212–15 (2000) (describing plot by human rights advocates to
undermine U.S. sovereignty).
123 See id. at 213–14 (citing opposition to the U.S. death penalty as an example
of this phenomenon).
124 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1567–82 (2003) (raising
concerns about delegation of decision making to international institutions); Jack
Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?, 1 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 327, 333 (2000) (describing sovereignty-based concerns about looking to
the writings of “legal academics, human rights activists, and international
institutions” in interpreting human rights norms); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of
Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 71, 72–73 (2000) (explaining constitutional concerns of international
delegation).
125 Bolton, supra note 122, at 213.
126 See id. (highlighting the case of General Augusto Pinochet as a situation
with “compelling arguments” in support of the state, here Chile, having sole
decisionmaking authority over whether or not to prosecute).
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that autonomy are part of efforts to bring the United States and
other States to the heel of the “globalist” agenda.127
Other critics view sovereignty as a protection for developing
States and their cultures. These critics argue that human rights are
often the culturally contingent preferences of the internationally
powerful imposed on the weak.128 If so, State sovereignty is a
potential bulwark against imposing the values of particular States
or social groups on dissenting cultures.129
This criticism is most trenchant when made by developing
world critics who view consent as a protection for weaker States
from the moral imperialism of Western Europe and the United
States.130 The consent principle ensures that the developing
world’s values are included within the human rights corpus,
essential if human rights are to be truly global.131
Makau Mutua, for example, describes a “savages-victimssaviors” metaphor at the core of human rights law, in which
Western actors demonize States with non-Western cultural
foundations as savages for victimizing their own population.132
This metaphor, he contends, permits human rights law and its
advocates to portray themselves as saviors, much as missionaries
or colonialists once did.133 The result is a “Eurocentric ideal” of
127 See id. at 212–13 (examining elaborate “globalist” conspiracy to undermine
sovereign prerogative).
128 See, e.g., MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL
CRITIQUE 10 (2002) (categorizing Western authors’ characterization of the universal
human rights movement as “a black-and-white construction that pits good against
evil”); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1190
(2007) (“[T]he presumed universal may also be the hegemonic.”); Weil, supra note
71, at 441 (describing nonconsensual formation of customary norms as
transferring lawmaking authority to a “de facto oligarchy” of the international
community).
129 See MUTUA, supra note 128, at 108 (arguing that any right that is in conflict
with self-determination should be void because of the need to protect weaker
cultures from the “evangelization” of stronger cultures).
130 See M.O. Chibundu, Making Customary International Law Through Municipal
Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1069, 1139–40 (1999) (noting that
human rights cases in U.S. court are like “a current affairs topics primer of the
trouble-spots of the non-Western world”).
131 See MUTUA, supra note 128, at 14 (arguing that resisting the current
Eurocentric human rights model is essential to the future of human rights as a
global movement).
132 Id. at 10–12.
133 Id.
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human rights that lacks legitimacy in the developing world.134
Consistent with this view, Mutua extols consent as a sacrosanct
protection from Western domination.135
Other scholars defend consent as a tool to secure State
compliance with human rights norms. International human rights
law largely depends on voluntary compliance because of the
general absence of coercive enforcement mechanisms.136 While, in
other areas of international law, States may use their full range of
diplomatic and economic tools to enforce international
commitments, violation by one State of its human rights
commitments is of little interest to other States.137 Thus, States are
largely left to self-comply with human rights obligations.
Given the dependence on self-compliance, diminishing the role
of consent in lawmaking may increase the risk of noncompliance.138
States are likely to be less willing to comply voluntarily with legal
obligations to which they never agreed. If the goal of human rights
law is to change State behavior, then it is pointless to create rules
that States have no intention of following.
Thus, scholars have raised important reasons why the
protection of human rights may be aided, or at least not hindered,
by the consent principle. Consent aids both in the determination of
what constitutes a human right and in the enforcement of such

Id. at 12.
See id. at 108 (“[T]he most fundamental of all human rights is that of selfdetermination and . . . no other right overrides it.”).
136 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 235 (2d ed.
1979) (“The forces that induce compliance with other law . . . do not pertain
equally to the law of human rights.”).
137 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 629 (2004) (noting that
externalities from human rights violations, such as massive refugee flows, are
sporadic and localized).
138 There are different theories offered as to why this might be so. See JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 10–14 (2005)
(offering an explanation from a rationalist perspective); Laurence R. Helfer,
Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 119–21 (2008)
(offering an explanation from realist, liberal and expressive perspectives).
Scholars have chronicled systematic noncompliance to human rights treaty
obligations. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1940 (2002) (describing violations of human rights
treaties as “common”). Studies of this sort raise a question about the extent to
which consent is an accurate proxy for compliance under any circumstances.
134
135
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rights. But these arguments have important limits on their
effectiveness.
Though the risk of moral imperialism is one that gives human
rights practitioners and scholars pause, at the core of the human
rights movement is the belief that there are universal human
rights. Once one is convinced that man has identified such a right,
hand wringing about consent risks the appearance of moral
relativism that is routinely dismissed within human rights
scholarship.139
Similarly, the argument that consent is important for
compliance smacks of apologism for State power, which is in
significant tension with human rights. If in fact a human right
exists, then the fact that many States will not carry out that right is
not an argument against recognizing it. To this end, Andrew
Guzman directly challenges the argument that compliance is a
relevant metric by which to evaluate the content of rights.140 He
contends that even if a small number of States alter their behavior
to comply with a right, while acknowledging that most do not,
human rights nevertheless benefits.141
Instead, the place of consent within the human rights corpus
will be more secure if human rights benefits to consent are
identified that do not depend on questioning the universality of
rights or apologizing for State power. Part 3 develops such an
argument.
3.

CONSENT AND SELF-DETERMINATION

Part 1 described the human rights consent problem. The
consent principle, rooted in protection of States’ rights, raises
concerns from the perspective of the protection of human rights.
These burdens have led to diminishment of the consent principle
in human rights theory and practice. Though there have been
critics of this effort, they have failed to mount an effective
challenge to the premise that a system oriented toward the

139 See MUTUA, supra note 128, at 34 (describing criticisms of his work on the
grounds that he is a relativist).
140 See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 747
(2012).
141 Id. at 752–53 (arguing that the existence of the proper rules is more
important than the level of consent or compliance).
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protection of human rights ought to reduce the scope of the
consent principle.
This Part argues the consent principle is essential to the
exercise of the collective human right of self-determination. It has
two objectives. First, it describes the contours of the human right
of self-determination, including an explanation of the values
protected by that right. Second, it links the consent principle to
self-determination.
3.1. Human Right of Self-Determination
The collective human right to self-determination emerges from
the intrinsic value of self-government to actualization of human
potential. Members of a community share experiences and
cooperate together such that over time they create a common life.
That life has value to its members separate and apart from the
instrumental benefits they receive from the community.142 This
insight is at the heart of “culture,” which people value intrinsically
because it provides a sense of belonging to a community with
shared attributes and a framework through which to enjoy
individual rights.143
Self-governing communities place inherent value on exercising
control over their own political, economic, social and cultural
development.144 Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz explain that
membership in communities is an aspect of human personality,
and therefore well-being, which requires the opportunity to
express membership.145 A primary method for doing so is
142 See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 51–63 (1977) (detailing the collective aspect of human
rights).
143 See ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE
FROM FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 79 (1991) (describing culture as “the
way of life with which its members identify and which gives meaning to their
pursuits and projects” and noting that part of participating in a culture is to
“adopt the perspective of ‘our’ interests rather than ‘my’ interests”).
144 See MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE: THE
NEW DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 2 (1982) (noting the origin of selfdetermination as recognition of the nation as “a community of organization, of
life, and of tradition”) (internal quotations omitted).
145 See Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL.
439, 440 (Sept. 1990) (explaining the value in self-government as “the value of
entrusting the general political power over a group and its members to the
group”).
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participation in the public life of the community, including
through political activity. Self-government is requisite for such
activity to be meaningful.
Self-government requires protection from external intervention
into local decision-making. External intervention can unduly
influence or override local decisions, thereby undermining the
promise of self-government.146
International law actualizes this philosophical insight through
the collective right to self-determination. Consistent with its
privileging of the State as its primary unit of measurement,147
international law recognizes the people of a State as a community
that enjoys the right of self-government.148 The people of the State
are sovereign, and provide the government its powers through
their consent to be governed.149 They must be able to direct their
development, free from external intervention, in order to realize
the promise of self-government.
This concept first bloomed as a principle in response to
colonialism and foreign occupation, which deprive communities of
their opportunity to self-govern.150 The U.N. Charter includes self146 See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS 35–36 (1995) (distinguishing external and internal elements of
collective rights).
147 The State is the unit recognized in international law as responsible for
representation of its peoples’ interests on the international plane. It was for this
reason that colonized peoples were presumed to be able to exercise selfdetermination only by forming their own State, free from the oppression of their
colonial masters. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
REAPPRAISAL 71–89 (1995) (detailing the practice related to external selfdetermination).
148 See Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics,
9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 209, 210 (1980) (describing States as “presumptively . . . the
arena” in which self-determination is exercised).
149 See Mortimer Sellers, Republican Principles in International Law, 11 CONN. J.
INT’L L. 403, 407–08 (1996) (describing the influence of the American revolution on
self-determination).
150 During the pre-World War II period, a small number of influential
political leaders advocated for self-determination as a concept to guide
international affairs. See CASSESE, supra note 149, at 14–19 (explaining that Lenin’s
view was that ethnic or national groups enjoy the right to choose their own
sovereigns); Michla Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determination:
Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1976) (describing
Woodrow Wilson’s argument that every people have the right to choose the
sovereignty under which they live). Wilson’s ideals influenced the Versailles
Treaty ending World War I, especially in setting the German-Danish border and
freeing the Slavs in Czechoslovakia from Austro-Hungarian rule, but were
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determination as a principle guiding the United Nations.151 This
principle was invoked as the basis upon which newly decolonized
territories could seek statehood if approved by its people through
plebiscite. This principle was used to support the decolonization
of Africa and Asia; the struggle against racist regimes in South
Africa and Rhodesia; and is invoked to support creation of an
independent Palestinian State and as a basis for resolution of
sovereignty over Kashmir.152
Self-determination evolved into a collective human right in
both Covenants that together serve as an international bill of
rights.153 Both the ICCPR and ICESCR begin with an identical
right: “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”154 This
right is the first human right found in the Covenants because

severely compromised in other areas. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to
Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 53 (1992).
However, selfdetermination had relatively little purchase before World War II. See Report of the
Committee of International Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with
the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands
Question, OFFICIAL J. OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, Oct. 1920 (rejecting the existence
of a right of self-determination that gave national groups the right to separate
themselves from their existing State without consent).
151 See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (describing development of “friendly
relations . . . based on respect for the principle of . . . self-determination of
peoples” as a purpose of the United Nations).
152 World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia
and Related Intolerance, Aug. 31–Sept. 8, 2001, Report of the World Conference
Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (“Durban
Declaration”), ¶ 63, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12 (Jan. 25, 2002) (“We
recognize the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination
and to the establishment of an independent State.”); Interim Rep. of the U.N.
Comm’n for India & Pakistan, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. S/1100 (Nov. 9, 1948) (“The
Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the
future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in
accordance with the will of the people . . . .”).
153 One hundred sixty–seven (167) States are parties to the ICCPR and one
hundred sixty (160) States are parties to the ICESCR, meaning that a commitment
found in these treaties are legal obligations for the vast majority of States. See
generally ICCPR, supra note 12; ICESCR, supra note 12.
154 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 1, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 12, at art. 1,
para. 1.
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negotiators agreed that self-determination is a prerequisite for
enjoyment of individual rights.155
The text of the Covenants, their negotiating history, and
subsequent practice show the human right to self-determination
guarantees: (1) the people as a whole in all countries and
territories of the world;156 (2) a continuing and permanent right to
(3) use the State to direct development free from external
intervention.
First, the Covenants are clear that the human right to selfdetermination extends to peoples as a whole in all countries and
territories.157 For example, the American people as a whole enjoy
the right to self-determination. The use of the word “all” in the
text of the Covenant provisions provides textual support for this
interpretation. The negotiating history indicates it was used after
the rejection of many phrases designed to limit the term to portions
of a population,158 or to colonized peoples.159
States have generally interpreted Article 1 to apply to the
population of States as a whole. When India ratified the ICCPR
155 China, Lebanon, Poland, and Yugoslavia, among other States gave
precedence to self-determination. MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX
PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
20–21 (1987). See also NOWAK, supra note 82, at 13 (describing firm rejection by
negotiating parties of the view that self-determination is not a human right). This
view prevailed over Western concerns that self-determination was insufficiently
clear to be defined as a human right. BOSSUYT, supra note 157, at 20 (chronicling
the negative comments of Australia, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Sweden).
156 In addition to the people of a sovereign nation as a whole, Article 1 also
includes within its ambit significant national or ethnic groups within a
multinational State. Such peoples are in contrast to ethnic, linguistic, and
religious minorities who were granted separate protection by Article 27 of the
ICCPR, and were apparently excluded from Article 1 protection. See CASSESE,
supra note 147, at 61 (noting that the word “peoples” would have been excluded
from the text had it not been for the “clear understanding that it was not intended
to refer to minorities”). The difference between minorities and sub-national
peoples is slippery and not well developed in the ICCPR negotiating history or
practice. NOWAK, supra note 82, at 20–22.
157 Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by
Invitation of the Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 189, 201–03 (1986).
158 States rejected qualifiers like “large compact national groups,” “ethnic,
religious or linguistic minorities,” and “racial units inhabiting well-defined
territories” because it was believed that people should be understood in a
“general” sense. G. A. Res. 10 (II), ¶ 9, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (July 1, 1955).
159 The Soviet Union led the effort to limit the right of self-determination to
people living under colonial rule or foreign occupation, but was rebuffed by the
other negotiating States. CASSESE, supra note 147, at 49.
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and the ICESCR, it entered a declaration stating that Article 1
extends only to “peoples under foreign domination,” and not “to
sovereign independent nations or to a section of a people or a
nation.”160 India felt compelled to make such a declaration because
it was concerned that the phrase “all peoples” is generally
interpreted to include the people as a whole of sovereign States.161
France, West Germany, and the Netherlands confirmed India’s fear
by raising objections to the Indian declaration on grounds it was an
invalid reservation, indicating their deep disagreement with
India’s interpretation of the provision.162
The HRC also interprets the right of self-determination to
extend to the people as a whole of a sovereign State. It rejects
reservations to Article 1(1) that restrict the scope of protection to
extend to anything less than the people as a whole of the State.163
The HRC admonished Azerbaijan when it asserted that Article 1(1)
extended protection only to former colonies. The HRC stated it
“regretted” this position, noting its view that the ICCPR
guarantees the right of self-determination to “all peoples and not
merely to colonized peoples.”164
Anne Peters challenges the claim that self-determination is a
right owed collectively to the people of a State, arguing it is better

160 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N.
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no
=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last visited July 25, 2012) (“India declares
that the words ‘the right of self-determination’ appearing in [this article] apply
only to the peoples under foreign domination and that these words do not apply
to sovereign independent States or to a section of a people or nation—which is the
essence of national integrity.”).
161 See CASSESE, supra note 147, at 60 (characterizing Indian declaration as a
reservation).
162 See U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 160 (listing objections to
declarations and reservations).
163 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 11,
¶ 9.
164 Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 296, U.N. Doc. A/49/40; GAOR, 49th
Sess., Supp. No. 40 (Vol. II) (1994). It also appears that Azerbaijan’s concern was
with respect to Article 1 extending rights to minority groups, not to the
Azerbaijani people as a whole. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Initial
Reports of States Parties due in 1993: Azerbaijan, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/81/Add.2 (Mar. 8, 1994) (raising concerns about “micronationalism”
and claims of “regional groupings within States”).
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conceived of as an individual right.165 While she acknowledges
that the “technical” rights-holders with self-determination are
“peoples,” she dismisses the argument that the right is intended to
be held by a collective.166 Peters argues that the concept of
“peoples” is arbitrary, given the difficulty in distinguishing
between peoples and minorities.167 To attribute legal significance
to an arbitrary grouping makes little sense. She also questions
whether the Covenants—otherwise filled with individual rights—
would begin with a collective right.168 Instead, Peters claims that
self-determination protects an individual’s right to determine his
or her fate, in and through the community.169
Peters’ approach is inconsistent with the negotiating history
and State practice surrounding the provision as just described. The
HRC has specifically rejected this view, concluding it cannot hear
claims through its communications procedures for violations of
Article 1(1) because its jurisdiction is limited to individual rights,
and Article 1(1) protects collective rights.170
Moreover, the collective privileged by the Covenants—the
people of a sovereign State—is not arbitrary given that
international law has a history of prioritizing the State as the
165 Peters, supra note 34, at 541. Such a view is consistent with scholars who
claim there is generally no room in liberal human rights theory for collective
rights. Tesón, for example, argues that collective rights—which cannot be
reduced to a collection of individual rights—are social policies masquerading as
rights. TESÓN, supra note 34, at 133. Such a deception is undertaken for rhetorical
purposes, he argues, as it strengthens the rhetorical appeal of the social policy.
See id. at 136–37 (opposing granting social policies the rhetorical weight accorded
to individual rights).
Such criticism fails to account for the presence of collective rights in most
international and domestic rights instruments. See BUCHANAN, supra note 34, at 77
(describing aspects of freedom of association and federalism as by definition
collective rights). It also attributes a false clarity to a dichotomy between
individual and collective rights. See id. at 77–79. Individual rights can often be
justified in collective terms and vice-versa. Id. Insisting that collective rights be
described in individual terms, as Peters does with self-determination, obscures an
important attribute of the right.
166 Peters, supra note 34, at 541.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 See A. B. v. It., Commc’n No. 413/1990, ¶¶ 3.2, 4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/40/D/413/1990 (U.N. Human Rights Comm. Nov. 2, 1990) (rejecting
individual claims for violation of Article 1(1)); Rep. of the Human Rights Comm.,
¶¶ 401–02, U.N. Doc. A/42/40; GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1987) (same).
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relevant unit of measurement. Self-determination is premised on
the idea that the people of the State are sovereign within the State,
thus making the people of the State an appropriate collective to
exercise the right. Though, as Peters suggests, the concept of
“peoples” becomes more complicated in multi-ethnic States,171 this
problem at the margins does not undermine the validity of “the
people” as a whole of the State as a collective rights-holding entity.
More fundamentally, Peters’ approach ignores the normative
value attached to belonging to a self-governing community with
the capacity to direct development as it sees fit separate and apart
from the instrumental individual benefits that such a community
confers. The human experience values culture and community as
intrinsically valuable and, in the process, develops a sense of
shared interests separate and apart from individual interests.172
Thus, to describe self-determination in individual terms is to miss a
significant portion of what the right describes.173
Second, the right to self-determination enjoyed by all peoples is
continuing and permanent and not extinguished by statehood.
The original draft text of the ICCPR prepared by the Human Rights
Commission stated that “[a]ll peoples . . . shall have the right of
self-determination.”174 The “shall” was dropped during the U.N.
negotiations of the provisions.175 The chairman of the U.N.
Committee assigned to negotiate the text explained to the larger
group of States that this change was designed to emphasize that
the right was permanent, and not extinguished with statehood.176

Peters, supra note 34, at 541.
See BUCHANAN, supra note 34, at 79 (arguing against reducing collective
rights solely to the instrumental benefits they confer to individuals).
173 Even under Peters’ approach, consent is relevant to the protection of selfdetermination. Under Peters’ analysis individuals possess the right to participate
in the public life of the State “to determine their fate in and through the
community.” Peters, supra note 34, at 541. Diminishing the consent principle in
human rights lawmaking constricts an individual’s right to determine one’s fate
through the community, because it reduces the extent to which the community
controls matters important to the human experience. The individual’s right to
determine his or her fate through the community is diluted by a decrease in
community powers. This cost to individual rights is not currently considered a
factor in evaluating proposals that diminish consent either.
174 See G.A. Res. 10 (II), supra note 158, at 13 (providing original draft text).
175 CASSESE, supra note 147, at 54.
176 See id. (quoting the Chairman of the Third Committee Working Group).
171
172
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Reporting on Article 1 by State parties to the ICCPR and the
ICESCR confirms that States understand the Article 1 requirement
as continuing. The HRC in General Comment 12 wrote that, while
States were always including Article 1 within their reports on
compliance with the treaty, they were too often limiting that
information to election laws.177 Instead, the HRC asked States to
provide information on the “constitutional and political processes
which in practice allow the exercise of this right.”178 Consistent
with this request, even established States long since removed from
colonialism report on measures they have taken to comply with
Article 1.179
Third, this continuous right enjoyed by all peoples entitles
them to use the political institutions of the State to direct
development without external intervention. Such a right emerges
from the face of the text granting peoples the right to “freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.”180
The negotiating history of the provision indicates that States
wanted to enshrine a “very comprehensive conception of the right
of self-determination.”181 To that end, the world’s peoples are free
to “establish its own political institutions, to develop its own
economic resources, and to direct its own social and cultural
evolution, without the interference of other peoples or nations.”182

177 Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., General Comment 12 (21): Article 1,
21st Sess., ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/39/40; GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1984).
178 Id. ¶ 4.
179 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Third Periodical Reports of
States Parties Due in 1993: Peru, ¶¶ 5–8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/83/Add.1 (Mar. 21,
1995) (describing how Peru satisfied Article 1 through establishment of a
republican form of government allowing for democratic participation by all of its
citizens).
180 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 1, para 1; ICESCR, supra note 12, at art. 1,
para. 1.
181 G.A. Res. 10 (II), supra note 158, at ch. IV, ¶ 12. This broad conception of
self-determination even provoked concerns that it would lead to discrimination
against foreigners within the State, although Parties were confident other
provisions in the Covenants prevented such an outcome. See id. at ch. IV, ¶ 13
(noting worries that it would prompt “burning of foreign books and the
confiscation of foreign investments”).
182 Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

PADMANABHAN_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

42

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

2/23/2014 2:54 PM

[Vol. 35:1

The HRC hewed to this broad interpretation in General
Comment 12.183 There, the HRC admonished, “States must refrain
from interfering in the internal affairs of other States and thereby
adversely affecting the exercise of the right to selfdetermination.”184 This link between self-determination and nonintervention has been repeated in resolutions of the General
Assembly185 and by the ICJ.186
There are good reasons to believe that States view this threepart understanding of self-determination as customary.187 Most
States of the world have accepted the collective right to selfdetermination as a treaty obligation by joining either or both of the
Covenants.188 Moreover, the three-part formulation described here
is repeated in numerous international agreements and resolutions
of international organizations.189
183 Antonio Cassese employs a similar interpretation of this term in his
treatise on self-determination. Cassese explains that Article 1(1) protects a State’s
political institutions from outside interference, in particular, reinforcing the
customary prohibitions on interference with the political independence and
territorial integrity of another State. CASSESE, supra note 147, at 55.
184 Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., General Comment 12 (21), supra note
177, ¶ 6.
185 See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A.
Res. 2131 (XX), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965) (“Every State has an
inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems,
without interference in any form by another State.”); see also Jean Salmon, Internal
Aspects of the Right to Self-Determination, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION
253, 258 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993) (describing self-determination and nonintervention as “two sides of the same coin”).
186 Nicaragua Case, supra note 8, ¶ 205 (condemning interference in the choice
of political, economic, social and cultural systems).
187 Self-determination is often described as a jus cogens norm. See, e.g., JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (2d ed. 2006)
(including self-determination within the list of peremptory norms). However, it
appears that only the application of self-determination to colonized peoples
achieves this lofty status. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Right to SelfDetermination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, ¶ 70, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980) (by Héctor Gros Espiell) (arguing selfdetermination is peremptory in its anti-colonial form).
188 See ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 1, para 1 (“All peoples have the right of
self-determination.”); ICESCR, supra note 12, at art. 1, para. 1 (containing the same
right).
189 See, e.g., Organization of the African Union, African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, art. 20, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (Jun. 27,
1981) (“[All peoples] shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue
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This Article does not, however, undertake the potentially
painstaking task of proving it is so. Nevertheless, most States of
the world have accepted self-determination as a binding obligation
through ratification of one or the other of the Covenants.190 The
text of these treaties and the practice thereunder demonstrates that
the people as a whole of a State have a collective continuing right
to self-direct development free from external intervention.
3.2. Self-Determination and Consent
The consent principle is essential to the realization of the
collective right to self-determination. The link between selfdetermination, and consent to human rights obligations, stems
from the relationship between political, economic, social, and
cultural development, and human rights. Part of directing
development involves deciding which international human rights
obligations to accept because these obligations set the conditions
within which development will occur.191 For example, the decision
whether or not to permit women to choose abortions impacts
issues as diverse as the role of religion within society, women’s
health, and women in the workplace. Similarly, the decision of a
transitional society on whether to prosecute those who committed
serious international crimes influences the distribution of political
power, development of the rule of law and domestic legal
structures, and the economic well-being of victims and victims’
families.
their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely
chosen.”); Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] Final Act, at
7 (Aug. 1, 1975), available at http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true
(“By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all
peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they
wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and
to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural
development.”); Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV)
(Oct. 24, 1970) (“[A]ll peoples have the right freely to determine, without external
interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development. . . .”).
190 See supra note 188 and accompanying text (identifying the right of selfdetermination in the Covenants).
191 See Crawford, supra note 14, at 121 (claiming a heightened interest for
popular participation on human rights questions given their impact on the
internal life of the State).
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It is through the State that the people of a State communicate
the decision on whether to undertake international human rights
obligations to other States and international actors.192 The act of
consent is a manifestation of self-determination because it
represents the people’s decision on whether and how to condition
development with international commitments. Self-determination
mandates that other States and the international community
respect this decision in order to permit the people to develop its
society ‘freely.’
This value for the consent principle is different from the values
attributed to consent by the conventional theories described in Part
1. Specifically, the link between consent and self-determination
locates a value for consent that is neither sovereigntist, nor
relativist, nor apologist.
The traditional understanding of consent roots its value in
States’ rights, a sovereigntist conception that is challenged by the
idea that humans, not States, are the core protected entities in
international human rights law.193 By contrast, the link between
consent and self-determination demonstrates that consent is
valuable because of the ability it gives humans to participate
meaningfully in self-directing the development of their State. Its
value is intrinsic to human rights, not extrinsic.
Consent has also been valued by some scholars for providing
different cultures, especially subordinate developing cultures, the
opportunity to have their voices heard in the development of
human rights.194 Consent respects the different conceptions of
human rights that exist globally. This argument is potentially
relativist in nature; consent protects pluralism in a world in which
there is no right answer to what human rights law should require.
By contrast, the relationship between consent and selfdetermination posits nothing about whether different cultures do
or do not agree about the content of rights, or whether there is a
right answer to what human rights law ought to require. Rather,
humans value participating in communities that decide rights
192 See id. at 129 (explaining that international law has traditionally viewed
the established government of a State as the voice for all its people).
193 See supra Sections 2.1 and 2.2 (describing the traditional consent principle
and human rights challenges to consent).
194 See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing Mutua’s view of the
necessity of self-determination to protect weaker cultures).
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questions for themselves, free from external intervention. Whether
they ultimately arrive at the same substantive decision as other
communities is revealing as to the existence of a genuine global
consensus on the content of rights.
Lastly, consent is praised by some scholars for promoting State
compliance with human rights norms, which is ultimately the goal
of human rights law.195 But letting the desire for State compliance
to drive the content of rights is an apologist position because it
conforms the law to State power. Valuing consent for its
relationship to self-determination is not apologist.
Consent
matters, not because States are powerful, but because the people
within States value participation in self-directing communities, free
from external intervention.
While consent is necessary for the protection of selfdetermination, it is not sufficient to protect self-determination. As
with any group right, there is the risk that the individuals
exercising that right on behalf of the group act in ways that benefit
themselves at the expense of the group.196 The extent to which a
State represents its people varies significantly from State to State.197
The government may not represent its people because of how it
came to power or how it has behaved once it was in power.198 Or,
the people of the State may not form a single community engaged
in pursuit of a common life—a problem common in multi-ethnic
States. Historian Samuel Moyn argues that it was disillusionment
with the ability of States to satisfy self-determination that, in part,

195 See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 138, at 73 (claiming a role for consent in
promoting compliance with international law).
196 See BUCHANAN, supra note 143, at 78 (“[G]roup rights encourage hierarchy
and create the possibility of opposition between the interests of those who control
the exercise of the right and the interests of other members of the group.”).
197 See, e.g., MUTUA, supra note 128, at 90 (noting that African States act
inconsistently with the rights of their people in order “to maintain their personal
privileges and retain power.”); Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International
Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1944, 1966 (1996–97) (“[T]he idea that the governments of Burma, Nigeria, or
Somalia speak for their people is patently false.”).
198 This analysis is based upon a distinction developed by Fernando Tesón.
See TESÓN, supra note 34, at 57 (distinguishing between vertical and horizontal
illegitimacy in States).
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spawned the desire for greater international regulation of human
rights.199
Even though States are not always representative of their
people, there are at least two reasons why the relationship between
consent and self-determination should nevertheless be privileged
in human rights lawmaking. First, any effort to diminish the
consent principle in response to unrepresentative States will
necessarily harm the self-determination of those within
representative States. This reality holds true because there is no
agreed test on what constitutes a representative State.
Some western States argue that self-determination mandates
that governments provide their citizens with the civil and political
rights needed to participate in the public life of the State.200
Australia informed the HRC that it “interpreted self-determination
as the matrix of civil, political and other rights required for the
meaningful participation of citizens” in the public life of the
State.201 Similar statements have been made to the U.N. Third
Committee by Germany,202 the United Kingdom,203 and the United
States.204
The HRC, while not directly interpreting Article 1(1) of the
ICCPR in this way, has argued that the “related . . . but distinct”
199 See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 118–19
(2010) (arguing that human rights law emerged into its current form from 1970s
due to disillusionment with previous utopian theories including selfdetermination).
200 Antonio Cassese identifies ICCPR rights that he believes are required to
ensure participation in the public life of the State: freedom of expression; peaceful
assembly; free association; and the right to vote. CASSESE, supra note 147, at 53.
201 Rep. of the U.N. Human Rights Comm., ¶ 428, U.N. Doc. A/43/40;
GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1988).
202 See U.N. Third Comm., Summary Record of the 4th Meeting, ¶ 47, U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.5; GAOR, 37th Sess. (1982) (arguing a nation has fully realized
self-determination if “individual citizens could fully enjoy their fundamental
rights and freedoms, such as freedom of speech, freedom of information, freedom
of assembly and association as well as [travel rights]”).
203 See Geoffrey Marston, Subjects of International Law-States-Self Determination,
1984 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 430, 432 (contending that self-determination requires
“rights to freedom of thought and expression; the rights of peaceful assembly and
freedom of association; the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, either
directly or through freely chosen representatives; and the right to vote and be
elected at genuine periodic elections”).
204 See CASSESE, supra note 147, at 303 n.47 (quoting a 1972 statement by the
U.S. delegate to the UN General Assembly’s Third Committee stating “[F]reedom
of choice is indispensable to the exercise of the right of self-determination”).
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Article 25(a) guarantees every citizen the right to participate in the
public life of the State.205 It reads this provision of the ICCPR as
requiring governments to permit their citizens to participate in
government through freedom of expression, assembly, and
association.206
Some scholars build on this argument and claim there is an
emerging right to democracy in international law. Thomas Franck
and James Crawford both locate a right to democracy based in part
on the right to self-determination. Franck defines this right as
“free, fair and open participation in the democratic process of
governance . . . .”207 Crawford argues that democracy requires the
State to protect a range of rights, including freedom of expression
and assembly.208
Not surprisingly, many States reject the argument that
democracy is a sine qua non of a representative State. The General
Assembly affirms that it is the “concern solely of peoples to
determine methods and to establish institutions regarding the
electoral process, as well as to determine the ways for its
implementation according to their constitutional and national
legislation.”209 States that are non-representative from a Western
liberal perspective sometimes argue that their peoples chose to
create a political system that, while different from liberal
democracy, is nevertheless an acceptable exercise of selfdetermination.210

205 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment Adopted by the Human
Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: General Comment No. 25 (57), 57th Sess., ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (Aug. 27, 1996).
206 Id. ¶ 8.
207 Franck, supra note 150, at 59.
208 Crawford, supra note 14, at 116.
209 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 45/151, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/151 (Dec. 18, 1990)
(asserting that nations should respect the principles of national sovereignty in the
election process).
210 See Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. A/42/40, supra note 170,
¶ 286 (explaining how the people of Zaire opted for “Mobutisme,” or a system
without political parties organized under teachings of former President Mobutu);
Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 506, U.N. Doc A/46/40; GAOR, 46th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40 (1991) (describing Sudan’s argument that its people opted for
government under Shariah law that cannot by definition provide all the civil and
political rights found in the ICCPR).
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There are reasons to be doubtful that human rights law can
resolve this dispute. A State will never agree that international law
demands a standard of representation to satisfy self-determination
that it cannot satisfy. Thus, a consent-based process is highly
unlikely to produce a required standard of representation.
Moreover, there may not be one international standard by
which to judge whether a State is representative of its people. It
may be difficult for those outside of a State to judge the fit between
a government and its people because they do not have the same
experiences as those within the State.211
Brad Roth argues, for example, that the people of a State may
opt for an illiberal form of government out of a preference for
unity, stability, decisive leadership, and better long-term planning
free from the pressures of electoral politics.212 Without opining
here on whether this claim has merit, arguments of this sort
demonstrate the difficulty one faces in asserting States are
illegitimate representatives of their own people based on a failure
to provide civil and political rights. A more extreme repudiation
of the government appears required.213
Because human rights law cannot distinguish between
representative and unrepresentative States, except at the margins,
limiting restrictions on consent to unrepresentative States is
infeasible. Instead, any restrictions on consent will draw in both
representative and unrepresentative States.
And, as a
consequence, such restrictions will burden the self-determination
of those in representative States.
Consider, for example, the decision by TMB and human rights
courts to employ a teleological approach to treaty interpretation.214
Such an approach prioritizes the purpose of protecting human
rights as understood by the TMB or court over indicia of State
consent. Assuming the government of North Korea does not
represent its people, departing from the consent of the North
Korean government does not appear to implicate selfdetermination. But the teleological interpretative approach is not
211
212

(1999).

Walzer, supra note 148, at 212.
BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 27–28

Id. at 419; Walzer, supra note 148, at 214.
See supra Section 2.3.2 (discussing treaty interpretation practices by TMB
and human rights courts).
213
214
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limited to locating obligations of unrepresentative States. Sweden
too would be constrained by the TMB or court treaty
interpretation. And departures from the consent of Sweden would
impinge on the self-determination of the Swedish people.
Second, the departures from the consent principle described in
Part 1 do not transfer decision making on rights questions to
institutions or individuals that are any more representative of
unrepresented peoples than their dysfunctional States.
In
customary law, the Nicaragua rule diminishes the ability of any
particular State to dissent from a putative custom through contrary
behavior.215 Thus, a State like North Korea, which does not
represent its people, cannot block the formation of human rights
law through its contrary practice without verbal repudiation of the
underlying right.
But this outcome does not give the otherwise disenfranchised
North Korean people any voice in formation of human rights
customs. Rather, it merely shifts decision-making authority from
one unrepresentative institution (the government of North Korea)
to other institutions that do not represent the Korean people, other
States. Other departures from the consent principle transfer
similar authority from unrepresentative States to TMB, human
rights courts, and even activist groups and scholars.
This discussion suggests that, while improving the
representation States afford their people is critical to satisfying the
promise of self-determination, restricting the consent principle is
no solution. It does not provide disenfranchised peoples any
greater say in the content of human rights law. And it does restrict
the self-determination of those living within effectively
representative States.
4.

CONSEQUENCES

Part 2 establishes a human rights dimension to consent not
accounted for in the traditional State sovereignty based account of
the concept. Consent is essential to the protection of the collective
right to self-determination. This link means that efforts to reorient
the international system toward the protection of human rights
should value consent for the benefits it provides human rights.
215 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the ICJ’s holding in
the Nicaragua Case).
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Such an approach has not been taken because the relationship
between consent and self-determination has gone largely
unnoticed.216 This Part re-imagines the consent principle as one
rooted in human rights law and explores the consequences for
human rights lawmaking.
The most important insight provided in this Article is that
consent is a normative positive for the protection of human rights.
A valuable part of the human experience is the ability to
participate in a community with control over its development.
This requires control over international human rights obligations.
In exercising this control, peoples may opt for amorphous and
indefinite obligations to allow discretion in implementation on the
local level. They may also opt out of particular human rights
obligations entirely. Such outcomes are not per se negative to the
protection of human rights, but rather may reflect the successful
execution of self-determination.
This human rights value suggests tools like the margin of
appreciation, which grants States deference to their interpretation
of their rights obligations, has a stronger foundation in human
rights law than previously imagined.217 States should be given a
degree of freedom to make their own choices about how to best
comply with human rights obligations because of the impact those
obligations have on social development. Critics of the ECtHR’s use
of the margin of appreciation in its jurisprudence218 take an unduly
216 Scholars do sometimes note in passing that departing from the consent
principle is problematic from a democracy or self-determination perspective, but
rarely linger upon this point. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, WHOSE UNIVERSAL VALUES?
THE CRISIS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 21–23 (1999) (arguing that allowing human rights to
override State consent automatically undermines the human right of selfdetermination); Goldsmith, supra note 124, at 333 (describing democratic
legitimacy concerns in relying on academics and human rights activists to
determine the content of law); Oona A. Hathaway, International Delegation and
State Sovereignty, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 146 (2008) (noting that an overly
expansive understanding of core human rights norms can threaten selfdetermination and autonomy); Helfer, supra note 138, at 78 (stating the challenge
to democracy posed by international delegation increases with nonconsensual
lawmaking).
217 See Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of
Languages in Education in Belgium,” 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20–21 (1968)
(providing rationale for use of the margin of appreciation, translated here as
“margin of discretion”). The margin of appreciation, however, reserves for the
Court final say on interpretation of the treaty.
218 See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal
Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 852 (1999) (locating tension between the
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cramped view of human rights. Granting communities the ability
to make choices about how to organize society, rather than being a
concession to power politics or outdated conceptions of
sovereignty, permits people to exercise control over the contours of
their community, a value intrinsic to the human experience.
But like most human rights, self-determination is not
absolute.219 Most human rights balanced when in conflict with
competing rights, which argues in favor of recognizing limitations
to the consent principle where supported by a proper,
proportionate human rights justification.220 Such an approach
revolutionizes the way human rights law thinks about consent. As
a manifestation of State sovereignty, consent must be absolute, or
near absolute, to ensure States’ rights are vindicated. By contrast,
margin of appreciation and the goal of protecting human rights); Jeffrey A.
Brauch, The Dangerous Search for an Elusive Consensus: What the Supreme Court
Should Learn from the European Court of Human Rights, 52 HOW. L.J. 277 (2009)
(arguing that the scope of human rights should not be determined using societal
consensus because it is unworkable, and “endangers both human rights and the
rule of law”).
219 Peremptory norms are the one exception, as they void competing norms
located in treaties, are not subject to derogation or limitation, and may be
modified only by another norm of the same character. VCLT, supra note 19, at art.
53.
220 Provisions mandating balancing between competing interests are
expressly included in multilateral human rights instruments. See, e.g., ECHR,
supra note 85, at art. 9 (balancing freedom of thought, conscience and religion
against the needs of a democratic society to protect “public safety,” “public order,
health or morals,” and “the rights and freedoms of others”); ICCPR, supra note 12,
at art. 18 (allowing State restriction of freedom of thought, conscience and religion
where “prescribed by law” and “necessary to protect public safety, order, health,
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”); ICESCR, supra note
12, at art. 2 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of
legislative measures.”). They are also located in newer national constitutions. See
S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 27 (requiring a State to take measures to provide health care
services, food, water and social security “within its available resources”); INDIA
CONST. art. 41 (limiting right to work, education and public assistance to India’s
“economic capacity and development”).
Even in the United States, where rights provisions do not include any
express balancing requirements, balancing tests have been employed. See, e.g.,
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490–91 (1976) (limiting application of the
Exclusionary Rule to Fourth Amendment violations where the costs of application
were disproportionate to the benefit).
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as a human rights value, consent is subject to limitation in order to
accommodate competing rights.221
Proportionality analysis is missing with respect to selfdetermination today. Insufficient attention has been paid to what
sorts of human rights justifications support restricting selfdetermination, and whether departures from the consent principle
are proportionate to such goals.
Conventional theory identifies two important situations in
which departures from the consent principle are countenanced.
First, traditional international lawmaking mandates States behave
as States have customarily behaved, even where the outcome is
arguably nonconsensual. Second, peremptory norms are binding
on all States, including those who persistently object. In State
sovereignty terms, such departures from the consent principle
have been difficult to justify.222
But, in human rights terms, such departures from the consent
principle are easier to understand. International law recognizes
the right of the international community of States to set community
obligations, which individual States are expected to follow.223 The
peoples of States have the right to self-direct development only
within bounds set by the consensus of the international community
of States. Thus, to the extent international human rights law
evolves to restrict the ability of individual States to dissent from
genuine consensus within the international community on the
content of rights, then there is an established human rights
justification for doing so.
At least two of the legal developments described in Part 1.3. fall
into this category. In treaty law, the HRC claims it has the
authority to determine whether State reservations are consistent
221 If consent is not present then there must be an alternative constitutive
basis for the right in question. The fact that States customarily behave
consistently with the right is one such accepted basis. Another basis is the sense
among the community of States that the norm is peremptory and not subject to
dissent. And, as I argue in forthcoming scholarship, still another constitutive
basis for human rights law is the moral obligations of States. Vijay M.
Padmanabhan, Separation Anxiety: The Case for Inclusive Positivism in International
Human Rights Law, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming May 2014).
222 See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 178–
79 (1986) (arguing that State sovereignty mandates that States be permitted to
persistently object even to jus cogens norms).
223 See Henkin, supra note 72, at 43–44 (stating human rights law is akin to
international constitutional law, which trumps competing national laws).
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with the object and purpose of the Covenant. Where they are not,
the Committee severs the reservation and holds the State to the
original provision.224 The HRC also claims that a State may not exit
from the ICCPR once it becomes party to the Convention.225 Thus,
in totality, the HRC claims the authority to sever invalid
reservations and hold the State to the original obligation without
granting the State the opportunity to exit from the treaty. Such an
approach would result in the HRC holding States to rights
standards to which they never agreed,226 which is a severe
restriction of self-determination.
One way to recast the HRC’s views on reservations is that they
seek to pressure individual States to conform to a community
norm, which is in this case represented by the treaty standard in
question. Agreements like the ICCPR were negotiated by nearly
all of the world’s States in existence at the time of negotiation, and
today have been ratified by most. As a consequence, the standards
within represent a human rights version of community norms, the
enforcement of which is an accepted justification for restricting
self-determination.
Consider, for example, the U.S. reservation to Article 6(5) of the
ICCPR, which prohibits the juvenile death penalty. The U.S.
reservation, made when the juvenile death penalty was still lawful
in the United States,227 excludes application of Article 6(5) in
situations where juveniles are tried as adults, and therefore eligible
for the death penalty.228 The HRC has written that this reservation

224 See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (showing how the HRC
took this approach with Trinidad and Tobago’s reservation denying the HRC
jurisdiction over petitions by death row prisoners).
225 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 26 (61), supra note
117, ¶ 5 (“The Committee is therefore firmly of the view that international law
does not permit a State which has ratified or acceded or succeeded to the
Covenant to denounce it or withdraw from it.”).
226 See Helfer, supra note 138, at 77 (viewing the HRC approach to severance
of reservations as an example of nonconsensual lawmaking).
227 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (overturning earlier cases
and holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids execution of minors).
228 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/
Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2013) (providing a full record of
all U.S. reservations to the ICCPR).
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is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Covenant.229
Pursuant to the Committee’s view of reservations, the United
States is bound not to execute juveniles as a matter of treaty law,
despite its specific desire not to undertake such an obligation. This
approach incurs a significant human rights cost for the American
people. Their collective right to self-determination includes an
apparent entitlement to decide whether to use the juvenile death
penalty to combat crime.
But the HRC acts upon a legitimate human rights justification
when it seeks to remove the juvenile death penalty from the remit
of self-determination. The international community of States views
the prohibition on the juvenile death penalty as a community
obligation. The prohibition on the juvenile death penalty has been
accepted as an international legal obligation by all States except the
United States and Somalia through membership in the Convention
on the Rights of the Child.230 The need for outlier States like the
United States to conform to international community expectations
on human rights questions is an accepted justification for
restricting self-determination.
The same justification sometimes supports the ICJ decision in
the Nicaragua case. The ICJ concluded that contrary State practice
does not count against the existence of a custom if that behavior is
defended consistently with the putative custom. As discussed, this
approach restricts the ability of States to dissent from customs
through contrary behavior alone, a restriction on selfdetermination. But, where the custom in question is already well
established, such a rule pressures outlier States to fulfill
community obligations.
This analysis provides a new justification for Bruno Simma’s
argument that the Nicaragua rule is more justifiable in situations
where there is a clear custom already in place, as opposed to where

229 Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 279, U.N. Doc. A/50/40; GAOR, 50th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, (1995) (stating that the Committee finds the United States’s
reservations regrettable and incompatible with the “object and purpose of the
Covenant”).
230 See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (“No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed . . . .”).
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one is searching to determine whether a new custom has formed.231
If in fact traditional practice demonstrates the existence of a
community norm prohibiting particular conduct, then imposing
self-determination costs can be justified by the need to enforce
community norms.
By contrast, if no such international consensus is evident, some
other justification must exist for the restriction on selfdetermination. Often a putative custom, like the duty to prosecute
described in Part 1, lacks evidence that it is well established as a
community obligation within the international community of
States. In such cases work must be done to identify other human
rights justifications for infringing upon self-determination.
The Nicaragua rule is not alone in restricting consent in
circumstances where vindicating a community obligation is not at
stake. Traditionally jus cogens norms eliminate a State’s ability to
dissent only where there is general acceptance of the international
community that the conduct prohibited by the norm is outside
permissible bounds of State conduct.232 But, as described in Part
1.3. there are scholars and activists who have advocated for
recognizing still more peremptory norms, even in the absence of
universal or near universal agreement. Such restrictions must be
supported by a human rights justification other than enforcement
of community norms.
Similarly, as discussed in Part 1, TMB frequently depart from
the consent of States as their touchstone in interpreting treaty
obligations. When they do so, the interpretation that they proffer
often does not reflect any sort of consensus view within the
international community of States on the content of human rights
law.
For example, the Women’s Committee has pushed forward in
interpreting CEDAW to protect some abortion rights.233 It did so
231 See Simma, supra note 39, at 220 (arguing that the Nicaragua rule is sensible
in some but not all situations).
232 VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 53. See also Hathaway, supra note 216, at 147
(accepting restrictions on the right of an individual State to reject “limits on
government action that are shared by nearly every culture and religion, at least in
aspiration, if not always in reality”); Henkin, supra note 72, at 44 (“[A]n occasional
state cannot veto law that reflects the contemporary international political-moral
intuition.”).
233 See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (analyzing the Women’s
Committee’s General Recommendation 24).
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despite the absence of global consensus that laws criminalizing
abortion violate a community obligation; indeed, the continued
prevalence of criminal restrictions on abortion suggests that no
such consensus exists. Such restrictions must be supported by a
human rights justification other than pushing outlier States to
accept community obligations.
There are at least three potential new justifications for
restricting self-determination that are worth considering. First,
where there is an accepted community norm, restrictions on selfdetermination may be required for States to accept secondary
obligations necessary to effectuate the accepted norm. Scholars
have argued that the duty to prosecute serious violations of
international law is peremptory despite the absence of
international consensus on the existence of a duty because the
crimes being prosecuted are themselves peremptory.234 TMB and
human rights courts have found that the prohibition on torture and
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment includes an implicit,
absolute non-refoulement obligation because the prohibition on
torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is absolute.235
But caution is needed because the justification for the
secondary norm may not support the same restriction on selfdetermination that does the primary norm. For example, the
differences in the nature of the duty not to commit torture and to
protect against torture by third parties argue in favor of greater
self-determination restrictions in the case of the former compared
to the latter.236 It is critical to parse the specific reasons for

234 See generally Bassiouni, supra note 77 (advocating for a duty to prosecute
offenses which are forbidden in international law); Orentlicher, supra note 77
(summarizing the development of a duty to punish within international law).
235 See Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1835, 1855–56
(holding the protection of torture, including extradition that will result in torture,
is absolute regardless of the undesirability of the individual at issue); U.N.
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80], supra note 103, ¶ 12 (stating
that the ICCPR “entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise
remove a person from [the State’s] territory, where there are substantial grounds
for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm . . . .”); see also David
Jenkins, Rethinking Suresh: Refoulement to Torture Under Canada’s Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, 47 ALTA. L. REV. 125, 151 (2009) (viewing non-refoulement as jus
cogens).
236 See Padmanabhan, supra note 101, at 107–12 (arguing that the duty not to
torture and the duty to protect against torture by third parties are normatively
different).
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restricting consent in situations where there is no consensus that a
community obligation exists. Such an inquiry has to date often not
been undertaken because of the failure to recognize the selfdetermination costs.
Second, the need to protect minorities disfavored within the
political processes of States may justify restrictions on selfdetermination. Western legal systems are divided on the ability of
political institutions to protect minority rights. If politically
vulnerable minorities cannot exercise their voice in State
governments, then this failure may be a sufficient justification for
restricting self-determination on rights affecting such minorities.
Such a justification reflects Will Kymlicka’s distinction between
external and internal aspects of collective rights. Kymlicka argues
groups must be able to create barriers to prevent outsiders from
eroding group identity.237 But he disagrees with efforts to use
group status to force dissenting members of the group to act
consistently with group norms.238 Protecting dissenters may
require overriding the decisions of the group.
The difficulty, of course, is how to identify which norms
protecting minorities require a departure from the consent
principle. So-called minority rights, such as gay rights, women’s
rights, and rights of religious minorities, also go directly to the
heart of the kind of society and culture a people wish to maintain.
Removing such choices from the scope of self-determination would
be an intense burden on self-determination.
Third, humans may possess moral rights, or rights States ought
to provide, separate and apart from legal rights. The moral
imperative to protect moral rights through legal obligation may
justify departures from the consent principle. The concept of
universal human rights posits that humans qua humans enjoy
entitlements regardless of the State where they live. It is for this
reason that human rights are described as “universal” in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moral rights represent a
potential natural limit to self-determination, as peoples have no
right to use their respective States to develop in a manner that
transgresses the moral rights of a portion of its population.
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KYMLICKA, supra note 146, at 35–37.
Id. at 37.
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The problem with moral rights is determining their content.
There is no accepted methodology to be used to determine the
moral obligations of States. While there may be acknowledgment
that “ought” restricts the scope of self-determination, its
application to concrete restrictions on self-determination will
surely be contested. Claims that moral rights restrict selfdetermination must be carefully evaluated given the human rights
cost associated with the claims.
Even with a human rights justification, restrictions on selfdetermination must be proportionate to the justification proffered.
To that end, the restrictions to the consent principle described in
Part 1.3. vary greatly in intensity. The more severe the restriction
on self-determination, the stronger the human rights justification
required to support the restriction.
The most severe restrictions on self-determination occur where
the ability of the State to decide whether to undertake a human
rights obligation is most constricted. Human rights courts, like the
ECtHR, are empowered to issue binding treaty interpretations, and
can mandate State compliance. States have arguably delegated to
these courts authority to make law to fill in gaps within the treaty
regime.239 But such courts may exercise such authority in a manner
that creates obligations that mandate nonconsensual State action,
creating a significant challenge to self-determination.
Many of the practices described in Part 2.3. have a similar
effect. Efforts to label new norms peremptory seek to fully remove
State control over the rights question that is the subject of the
peremptory obligation, eliminating even the possibility of
persistent objection.
So too does the HRC approach on
reservations, which attempts to bind States to obligations as
written in the ICCPR even where the State has not agreed to that
obligation, which results in a nonconsensual treaty obligation.240
Severely restricting State control over its human rights obligations
requires the most robust human rights justification.
By contrast, TMB, which are not empowered to issue binding
interpretations of their respective treaties, can at most impose
reputational costs on States for their failure to abide by the
Simma, supra note 107, at 497.
See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text (discussing HRC General
Comment 24 and its application to the case of Trinidad and Tobago’s reservation
about death row inmates).
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interpretations.241 While these costs are impingements on the
consent principle, States retain the option of non-compliance or
treaty exit if they do not wish to comply. These opt-outs reduce
the extent to which self-determination is hindered. And as a
consequence these restrictions on the consent principle may be
supported by lesser human rights justifications.
5.

CONCLUSION

An international legal system oriented toward the protection of
human rights should still care about State consent. Too often,
existing debate cabins the reasons one should care about consent to
concerns about sovereignty, cultural relativism, or rights
implementation. But such a limited remit for consent is based
upon a failure of imagination with respect to the role of the State in
the protection of human rights.
The collective right to self-determination envisions the people
of a State as its sovereign. The people use their State to make
decisions about how to shape society for a community interested in
a common life. The consent principle gives the people of the State
decision making authority over international human rights
standards; whether to accept international supervision of
commitments; and the pace of rights development. Without such
control self-determination is a far less important right. Thus, there
is a strong human rights justification for State consent to play an
important role in international human rights lawmaking.
But, as justifications for the consent principle shift to selfdetermination, the contours of the principle itself must evolve. The
traditional consent principle, born in the era of States’ rights, fails
to provide adequate account of the desire of the international
community to mandate obligatory community norms. There may
be other justifications, such as the need to protect minority rights
or the moral rights of man, for restricting self-determination. Thus,
the traditional absolute consent principle is obsolete when applied
to human rights law.
Restrictions on the consent principle must be proportionate to
the justification proffered. Proportionality analysis has not been

241 See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text (summarizing the role of
limited authority of TMB).
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applied consistently in human rights practice and should be
applied going forward.
Re-imagining consent in this manner is difficult. But, as
Michael Reisman argued in general terms more than twenty years
ago, it is essential if we are to reconfigure the international legal
system around the protection of human rights.
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